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ABSTRACT
The electric power grids are one of the fundamental infrastructures of modern society and
are among the most complex networks ever made. Recent development in communications,
sensing and measurement techniques has completely changed the traditional electric power
grid and has brought us the intelligent electric power grid known as Smart Grid. As a critical
cyber-physical system (CPS), Smart Grid is an integration of physical components, sensors,
actuators, control centers, and communication networks.
The key to orchestrate large scale Smart Grid is to provide situational awareness of the
system. And situational awareness is based on large-scale, real-time, accurate collection and
analysis of the monitoring and measurement data of the system. However, it is challenging
to guarantee situational awareness of Smart Grid. On the one hand, connecting a growing
number of heterogeneous programmable devices together introduces new security risks and
increases the attack surface of the system. On the other hand, the tremendous amount of
measurements from sensors spanning a large geographical area can result in a reduction of
available bandwidth and increasing network latency. Both the lack of security protection
and the delayed sensor data impede the situational awareness of the system and thus limit
the ability to efficiently control and protect large scale Smart Grids in time-critical scenarios.
To target the aforementioned challenge, in this thesis, I propose a series of frameworks
to provide and guarantee situational awareness in Smart Grid. Taking an integrated ap-
proach of edge-cloud design, real-time data operations, and causal security analysis, the
proposed frameworks enhance security protection by anomaly detection and managing as
well as causal reasoning of alerts, and reduce traffic volume by online data compression. Ex-
tensive experiments by real or synthetic traffic demonstrate that the proposed frameworks
achieve satisfactory performance and bear great potential practical value.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As one of the fundamental infrastructures of modern society, electric power grids are
among the most complex networks every made [1]. Over the past years, electric power grids
have transformed from mostly isolated local systems to interconnected large-scale networks
to deliver electricity from producers to consumers over long distances [2, 3, 4, 5]. The
growing number of nodes, the increasing extent of interconnectedness, the rising variety of
distributed resources, controls and loads, all contribute to the complexity of electric power
grids.
Recent development in communications, sensing and measurement techniques has com-
pletely changed the traditional electric power grid. Technologies related to the Internet
of Things (IoT) in the fourth industrial revolution have brought us the intelligent electric
power grid known as Smart Grid. As a “digital upgrade” of the traditional electric power
grid, Smart Grid employs computer, communication, monitoring, control, and self-healing
technology for the following purposes [1, 6]:
• Facilitate the interconnection and operation of various distributed generating sources;
• Enhance distributed generation load balancing by grid energy storage;
• Provide the consumers with greater choice of supply and minimize their cost;
• Reduce the environmental impact;
• Increase the reliability and security of electric power delivery.
As a critical cyber-physical system (CPS), Smart Grid is an integration of physical com-
ponents, sensors, actuators, control centers, and communication networks. The states of the
physical components are measured and monitored by the sensors and the required operations
of physical components are carried out by actuators. Via the communication networks, the
control centers receive measurements from sensors and send commands to actuators, ensuring
the grid operates in desired states [7].
1.1 MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES
It is hard to orchestrate large scale Smart Grid which is a heterogeneous, widely dispersed,
yet globally interconnected system. The key to monitor and control Smart Grid is to provide
situational awareness of the system. NIST states that “the goals of situational awareness
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are to understand and ultimately optimize the management of power-network components,
behavior, and performance, as well as to anticipate, prevent, or respond to problems before
disruptions arise” [8]. Situational awareness is based on large-scale, real-time, accurate
collection and analysis of the monitoring and measurement data of the system [9].
Providing situational awareness of Smart Grid is challenging. On the one hand, connecting
a growing number of heterogeneous programmable devices together introduces new security
risks and increases the attack surface of the system. To make things worse, those devices are
mostly resource constrained and thus do not have the capability of providing strong security
protection by themselves. On the other hand, the tremendous amount of measurements from
sensors spanning a large geographical area can result in a reduction of available bandwidth
and increasing network latency. This in turn would hamper the timely analysis of the data
and slow down the notification of time-critical events [10, 11]. Both the lack of security
protection and the delayed sensor data impede the situational awareness of the system and
thus limit the ability to efficiently control and protect large scale Smart Grids in time-critical
scenarios.
The Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system (SCADA) and the Wide Area
Monitoring System (WAMS) are two of the most commonly used control and monitoring
systems for Smart Grid. There are different challenges in providing situational awareness in
these two systems and both systems deserve our attention.
• SCADA: The main challenge to guarantee situational awareness in SCADA is the
lack of security protection. Smart Grid provides the traditional electric power grids
with new functionalities and transforms the closed legacy control networks to open IP-
based networks. However, new security risks are also introduced to the system at the
same time. In the past, the electric power grids were considered to be secure due the
limited connectivity of the system and the proprietary controls by each company. This
is not true anymore since Smart Grid largely increases the connectivity of the system.
Nowadays, SCADA systems have much higher exposure and larger attack surface.
However, many devices and protocols in SCADA are not designed with security in
mind and lack the vital security protection capabilities. The situational awareness of
the system will definitely suffer if security breaches occur and are not treated quickly
and properly. So, the major concern in SCADA is the security protection of it.
• WAMS: The main challenge to guarantee situational awareness in WAMS is the huge
and increasing volume of data. In Smart Grid, WAMS has been widely accepted to
provide real-time monitoring, protection, and control. WAMS is a more advanced
technology than SCADA which is deployed to monitor selected critical nodes at this
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moment. However, we are seeing rapid increasing deployment of WAMS and there is
no sign that this trend will stop soon. Security in WAMS is less of a problem since
it uses more advanced devices and protocols. However, since WAMS requires data
to be captured and sent at very fast rate, the data volume in WAMS is much larger
than in SCADA and delay is a much bigger problem. The huge and rapidly increasing
data volume in WAMS imposes a heavy burden on the communication and storage
systems and could become the bottleneck for many real-time Smart Grid applications.
The delayed or dropped measurement data due to network congestions will certainly
hamper the situational awareness of Smart Grid.
Figure 1.1: Triangle of situational awareness in Smart Grid
In this thesis, we argue that there are three necessary requirements to provide situational
awareness to Smart Grid. As shown in Figure 1.1, the three requirements include real-time
data operations, causal security analysis, and edge-cloud design. The three requirements
form a triangle and the situational awareness of Smart Grid can only be achieved when all
three of them are considered.
Measurement and monitoring data of Smart Grid is generated, gathered, and sent to
the control center of Smart Grid for analysis all the time. For the data to be useful, one
important requirement is that the data operations in the system must be conducted in
real time. Since the term situational awareness is defined as “up-to-the-minute cognizance
or awareness required to move about, operate equipment, or maintain a system” [12], the
timely acquisition and analysis of sensor data is critical to guarantee situational awareness
of the grid. Also, real-time event processing is essential for Smart Grid, and cyber-physical
applications, running in the control centers, are usually subject to strict latency constraints.
Therefore, data operations in Smart Grid are time sensitive and we should always keep time
overhead and latency in mind for the rest of this thesis.
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Besides guaranteeing the timeliness of data, the security of Smart Grid is also vital for the
situational awareness of Smart Grid. And as we mentioned before, the goal of situational
awareness is more than just to know the state of the system but also to understand why
the system is in that state. In terms of security, knowing what anomalies are happening in
the system is not enough. Understanding why they happen is also of critical importance. If
only intrusion detection is deployed and the causes and consequences of the events are not
identified, it is hard or impossible for the operator to quickly digest the events and react
to them. Even if the events related to attacks are detected quickly, the entire system could
still suffer when the true reasons for the events remain unexplained and the operator fails to
resolve the attacks promptly. Therefore, to guarantee situational awareness of Smart Grid,
it is necessary to provide causal security analysis of the system which includes not only the
detection but also the reasoning of anomalies.
To provide situational awareness, another novel paradigm called edge computing (also
known as fog computing) [10, 13, 14] also needs be exploited. Edge computing is an ar-
chitecture that uses networking edge devices to carry out computing services closer to end
devices. By bringing more computing power to the outer edges of the network, which are
closer to the data sources, edge computing is able to process and analyze the massive data
from different kinds of end devices faster. This, in turn, can help to reduce the amount
of data to be transmitted to the data centers and to provide services with faster response
as well as greater quality [15]. For Smart Grid, the control centers host the cloud and the
substations include the edges. By using an edge-cloud design in Smart Grid, inspection and
preliminary analysis of SCADA traffic can be placed close to end devices to provide timely
information to power grid operators. The huge data volume in WAMS can also be reduced if
data compression operation is placed at the edge. Therefore, an edge-cloud design is essential
in providing situational awareness to Smart Grid by helping to achieve a faster actuation
and response of the Smart Grid system to events, a better utilization of the communication
bandwidth, and an increase of reliability and scalability [16].
1.2 THESIS STATEMENT
I claim that the following thesis statement is true.
To provide Smart Grid with situational awareness, we need an integrated approach of
edge-cloud design, real-time data operations, and causal security analysis.
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1.3 THESIS OVERVIEW
In this thesis, I design four frameworks, deployed in Smart Grid, to achieve the objective
of situational awareness. In this section, I give an overview of each of them and explain how
they help to achieve the objective.
1.3.1 OLAF: Operation-Level Traffic Analyzer Framework for SCADA System
As we mentioned in Section 1.1, the current SCADA systems in Smart Grid are facing
increasing security risks. They are primarily protected at the perimeter level with firewalls
at the boundary of the networks but are not equally protected against internal attacks. To
provide end-to-end security against both external and internal attacks, both the end host
devices and the network need to be secured. However, the end host devices in SCADA
such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) are
resource-constrained devices which do not have the ability to provide security analysis and
protection by themselves [17]. Therefore, in the current architecture, the control centers are
responsible for both the device status analysis and network traffic analysis. Data from the
measurement devices is transmitted to the control center for processing and analysis. As
the number of deployed measurement devices grows, it is increasingly harder for the current
architecture to provide up-to-date situational awareness to the power grid operators.
To address the above problem in Smart Grid SCADA networks, my approach in this
work [18] is the design of an edge-based, extensible, and efficient operation-level traffic
analyzer, called OLAF. OLAF is able to collect, aggregate and analyze the statistics in
network packets from both the flow level for network traffic analysis and the operation level
for device status analysis. I deploy OLAF close to the end hosts in the edge of SCADA
network to provide the operators with more up-to-date situational awareness of the whole
system and warn them of potential breaches more promptly. This work has been published
in IEEE SmartGridComm 2016 [18].
1.3.2 ISAAC: Intelligent Synchrophasor Data Real-Time Compression Framework for
WAMS
As stated in 1.1, WAMS have been widely accepted to provide real-time monitoring,
protection, and control of power systems. WAMS’s capability to support real-time decision-
making applications is based on the emerging and development of Phasor Measurement Units
(PMUs). Since PMUs have very high sampling rates and usually multiple data channels, the
volume of measurements collected is huge. And we can surely expect a multi-fold expansion
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in the already large volumes of data in WAMS due to the higher sampling rate of modern
PMUs, the increase in the number of PMUs and measurements per PMU. The huge and
rapidly increasing data volume in WAMS imposes a heavy burden on the communication and
storage systems and could become the bottleneck for many real-time smart grid applications.
If not handled carefully, the huge data volume in the communication system could result in
frequent and severe congestion. The situational awareness of the system could suffer a lot
from the extremely long delays or high packet loss rates that follow the congestion.
In this work, I propose an Intelligent Synchrophasor dAta reAl-time Compression frame-
work, named ISAAC, to be deployed at the edge of WAMS. Combining the Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), ISAAC has the capability
of largely improving the efficiency of communication and storage systems via data com-
pression while maintaining strong data fidelity. This work has been published in IEEE
SmartGridComm 2017 [19].
1.3.3 EDMAND: Edge-Based Multi-Level Anomaly Detection for SCADA Networks
As discussed in Section 1.3.1, I proposed a light-weighted operation-level traffic analyzer,
named OLAF, to provide preliminary analysis of SCADA. However, that is not enough to
guarantee situational awareness and a more thorough monitoring and analysis are required.
Based on different analysis granularity, data in SCADA network traffic generally can be
divided into three levels: transport level, operation level, and content level. Transport level
data refers to statistics in IP headers and transport protocol headers. Operation level data
refers to operation statistics in ICS protocols. Content level data refers to measurement
statistics from field devices. Monitoring and event detection of only one or two of the three
levels is not enough to detect and reason about attacks in all three levels. Also, data in each
level has its own characteristics, which requires distinct methods to deal with.
In this work, I develop an edge-based multi-level anomaly detection framework for SCADA
networks, named EDMAND. EDMAND is located inside the remote substations, which are
the edges of the SCADA network. It contains a multi-level anomaly detector to monitor
all three levels of network traffic data passing by. Appropriate anomaly detection methods
are applied based on the distinct characteristics of data in various levels. The concept
of confidence is introduced into the anomaly detection process and confidence scores are
assigned to generated alerts. Also, the generated alerts are aggregated and prioritized to
benefit further analysis before being sent back to control centers. This work has been
published in IEEE SmartGridComm 2018 [20].
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1.3.4 CAPTAR: Causal-Polytree-based Anomaly Reasoning for SCADA Networks
To promote the security of SCADA systems, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are in-
creasingly deployed by SCADA operators. The main objective of IDSs is to monitor the
system, detect suspicious activities caused by intrusion attempts, and report alerts to the
system operators. However, as we mentioned in Section 1.1, only knowing what anomalies
are happening in system without understanding why they happen is definitely not enough to
guarantee situation awareness. Traditional IDSs continuously generate tremendous number
of alerts without further comprehending them. Drowned in an ocean of unstructured alerts
mixed with false positives, SCADA operators are almost blind to see any useful information.
Due to the high volume and low quality of the alerts, it becomes a nearly impossible task for
the operators to figure out the complete pictures of the attacks and take appropriate actions
in a timely manner.
Therefore, there is a need for an efficient system to aggregate redundant alerts from IDSs,
correlate them in an intelligent manner, and discover attack strategies based on domain
knowledge. My previous work EDMAND, located at the edges of the SCADA network,
detects anomalies in multiple levels of the network, and sends aggregated and prioritized
meta-alerts to the control center. In this work, I present a causal-polytree-based anomaly
reasoning framework for SCADA networks, named CAPTAR. CAPTAR resides in the control
center of the SCADA network and takes the meta-alerts from EDMAND as input. CAPTAR
correlates the alerts using a naive Bayes classifier and matches them to predefined causal
polytrees. Utilizing Bayesian inference on the causal polytrees, CAPTAR is able to reveal
the attack scenarios from the alerts and produces a high-level view of the security state of the
protected SCADA network. I am planning to submit this work to IEEE SmartGridComm
2019.
1.4 THESIS CONTRIBUTION
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• Before I proposed OLAF, all the security analysis for SCADA networks happened in
the control center. Although edge-computing was already a popular paradigm at that
time, not many works had applied it to the Smart Grid domain. OLAF is one of the
earliest works to introduce the concept of edge-computing as well as smart edge devices
into Smart Grid. It is also one of the first works to place anomaly detection at the
edge of SCADA networks. By pushing security analysis to the edge, faster detections
can be achieved for anomalies and reactions can also be performed more promptly.
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• At the time I was developing ISAAC, issues caused by the huge data volume in WAMS
had not drawn much attention from researchers yet. Of all works that focus on alleviat-
ing the burden from the data volume, most of them only worry about storage problems
and use oﬄine compression to solve them. ISAAC is one of the first works that identify
the problem that huge data volume could cause on communication networks and use
online compression to target the problem. The challenges and requirements of online
compression in WAMS are different from those of oﬄine compression and ISAAC is
the first work to discuss and target them.
• In EDMAND, we divide network traffic data in SCADA into three levels: transport,
operation, and content levels. Previous works mostly focus on only one or two of the
three levels of data. In EDMAND, we cover all three levels and apply appropriate
anomaly detection mechanisms to data in each level based on their distinct character-
istics, which is necessary to see the whole picture of the attack. Also, EDMAND is one
of the first works to introduce the concept of confidence into the anomaly detection
process and assign confidence scores to generated alerts.
• Before CAPTAR, most works in the area of SCADA security stop at anomaly detection.
The true reasons that caused the anomalies are left unexplained. In CAPTAR, we go
one step further than that and use alert correlation and causal reasoning to understand
the causes of the anomalies. Attack scenarios can be revealed from the alerts and a
high-level view of the security state of the SCADA network can be produced. This
prevents the operator from being overwhelmed in the huge number of low-quality alerts
and provides situational awareness that is explainable.
1.5 THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter 2 introduces some background knowledge about Smart Grid to be used in the
rest of this thesis. In each of Chapter 3-6, I will describe in more details one of the four
aforementioned works, describing its design and elaborating on the evaluation performance.
To be more specific,
• In Chapter 3, to provide end-to-end security for SCADA systems in Smart Grid against
both external and internal attacks and enhance up-to-date situational awareness, I
propose an edge-based, extensible, and efficient operation-level traffic analyzer, called
OLAF.
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• In Chapter 4, to alleviate the burden of huge and rapidly increasing data volume in
WAMS and prevent the impairment of situational awareness by frequent and severe
congestion, I propose an intelligent synchrophasor data real-time compression frame-
work, named ISAAC.
• In Chapter 5, to provide Smart Grid SCADA systems with more comprehensive situ-
ational awareness, I develop an edge-based multi-level anomaly detection framework,
named EDMAND, to monitor and detect anomaly of all transport, operation, and
content levels of SCADA network traffic.
• In Chapter 6, to offer explainable situational awareness to Smart Grid, I present a
causal-polytree-based anomaly reasoning framework for SCADA, named CAPTAR, to
correlate alerts from EDMAND in an intelligent manner and discover attack strategies
based on domain knowledge.
In Chapter 7, I conclude this thesis and have a discussion of the generalization about this
thesis. Finally, I share some lessons learned and provide some directions of future research
in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
In this chapter, I will introduce some background knowledge about Smart Grid which
will be used in the following chapters of this thesis. In Section 2.1, I describe the basic
structure of the electric power system. Two commonly used systems in Smart Grid, namely
SCACA and WAMS, are briefly introduced in Section 2.2. Then two popular industrial
control protocols, Modbus and DNP3, are mentioned in Section 2.3.
2.1 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM
As a cyber-physical system, Smart Grid consists of both physical and cyber parts. The
physical part of Smart Grid is the electric power system. As it is shown in Figure 2.1, the ba-
sic structure of the electric power grid has four main components: generation, transmission,
distribution, and customer.
Figure 2.1: Basic structure of the electric power system [21]
In the generating stations, also referred to as power plants or power stations, electricity
is produced at lower voltages (10kV to 25kV). Most generating stations burn fossil fuels
such as coal, oil, and natural gas and use generators to turn mechanical power into electrical
power. Others use nuclear power, and there is an increasing trend of using renewable sources
such as solar, wind, hydro power, geothermal, etc. Near the generating stations, step-up
transformers increase the voltage of electricity from the generating stations for transmission.
In the transmission component, electricity is transmitted in bulk from generating stations
to substations over transmission lines. Transmission lines are usually operated at high volt-
ages (i.e., 115kV or above) to reduce the energy loss over long distances. Compared with
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low-voltage transmission, high-voltage transmission allows for less energy loss from conductor
heating and delivers a larger proportion of the generated power to the substations, and thus
achieves economic power transmission. Transmission lines are interconnected at switching
stations and substations to form a network called a power grid.
The distribution component is the final stage of electric power delivery which distributes
electricity from the transmission system to individual customers. Distribution substations
use step-down transformers to lower the transmission voltage to intermediate voltage levels
(2kV to 35kV). The primary distribution system feeds larger industrial and commercial
customers. It also carries the intermediate voltage power to small substations closer to
residential end customers. At these substations, voltage is again lowered by transformers
to a service voltage (i.e., 120V or 240V) and then electricity is carried by the secondary
distribution system to customers for residential use.
2.2 SCADA AND WAMS
What makes Smart Grid different from traditional power grids is its cyber part. The cyber
part has several systems that are widely deployed, including the Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition system (SCADA), the Wide Area Monitoring System (WAMS), and the
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). Among these three systems, SCADA and WAMS
are responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution components whereas the
AMI is responsible for the customer component. In this thesis, I focus on SCADA andWAMS
since they are more critical systems and are highly related to the situational awareness of
Smart Grid.
A SCADA system is a common industrial control system which is used to collect data from
sensors located at remote sites and to issue commands from a central site for control pur-
pose. The simplified architecture of a typical SCADA system is shown in Figure 2.2. The
major components in SCADA system include the Master Terminal Units (MTUs) in the
control centers, field controllers in the remote substations and the communication network
that connects them. The MTU, also referred to as SCADA server or supervisory controller,
is the core of the SCADA system. It is a server responsible for communicating between
the field controllers and the human-machine interface (HMI) software running on operator
workstations. The field controllers mainly consist of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). Further connected to sensors and actuators, these
controllers are responsible for transmitting telemetry data to the MTU and controlling con-
nected actuators by messages from the MTU [22]. The communication network connects
the MTU to RTUs and PLCs by radio, wire, or optical fiber connections. Industrial control
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protocols are used in the communication network and two of the most commonly used ones
will be introduced in Section 2.3.
Figure 2.2: Simplified architecture of SCADA
WAMS is a new advanced measurement technology to collect information. WAMSs ability
to support dynamic monitoring of the system conditions over large areas is allowed by the
emerging and development of a new data acquisition technology of phasor measurement.
A simplified architecture of WAMS is shown in Figure 2.3. Phasor Measurement Units
(PMUs) are installed in selected substations to measure the connected bus bars or power
lines. PMUs can measure frequency, current, and voltage at a rate of 30 Hz or higher.
The generated measurements are called synchrophasors, namely synchronized phasors, since
they contain both magnitudes and phase angles, and are precisely time-synchronized by the
GPS technology. The synchrophasor measurements from the PMUs are then transmitted
to Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs), where they are correlated and fed out as a single
stream. The time-aligned measurements are forwarded via WAN to the control center and
usually further concentrated by the PDC there. Finally, the measurements are consumed by
the WAMS applications in the control center. The phasors measured by PMUs at the same
instant can be seen as a snapshot of the system condition. By comparing the snapshots with
each other, monitoring of the dynamic as well as steady state of the system is achieved.
Figure 2.3: Simplified architecture of WAMS
WAMS is a more advanced technology than SCADA. SCADA can only provide non syn-
chronous information of the steady state of system with low sampling rate while WAMS
allows us to monitor the dynamic state of system synchronously in more elaborate time
scale. Since WAMS requires data to be captured and sent at very fast rate, the data volume
in WAMS is much larger than in SCADA and delay is a much bigger problem in WAMS.
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Nowadays, both SCADA and WAMS are utilized in Smart Grid. SCADA is used as the
major technology and WAMS is applied to selected critical nodes. Therefore, both SCADA
and WAMS are considered and discussed in this thesis.
2.3 MODBUS AND DNP3
In this section, I will briefly introduce two industrial control protocols commonly used in
SCADA: Modbus and DNP3. All our works for SCADA in the following chapters support
these two protocols. Note that common protocols used in WAMS include IEEE C37.118 and
IEC 61850. Since they do not affect the online data compression in WAMS which I focus
on, I will not describe protocols in WAMS in more details.
Figure 2.4: Modbus query–response cycle [23]
Modbus [24] is an application layer messaging protocol, which provides master-slave com-
munication between devices connected on different types of buses or networks. Usually, only
one device (the master) initiates queries while other devices (the slaves) respond by sending
the requested data or by taking the requested action [23]. In SCADA, MTU is a typical
master device and typical slaves include RTUs and PLCs. As it is shown in Figure 2.4, for
each Modbus transaction, the master originates a query message and expects a response
from a slave device. Similarly, a response message is constructed by the slave and returned
to the master when the slave receives a query. The master’s query consists of the device
address, a function code, any data to be sent, and an error check field. The function code
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in the query tells the slave what kind of action to perform. Any additional information
required by the slave to perform the function is included in the data bytes. And the slave
is able to verify the integrity of the query by using the error check field in the message.
The response message from the slave shares the same structure of the query message. In a
normal response, the function code is just an echo of the query function code and the data
bytes contain the requested value such as register values or status. If there is an error, the
function code is set to an exception function code indicating an error response and the data
bytes contain an error code that further describes the error.
Modbus’s data model relies on a series of tables that have distinguishing characteristics.
The four primary tables are listed in Table 2.1. Modbus supports individual selection of
65536 data items for each of the primary tables. The function codes of Modbus can be
categorized into three types: public, user-defined, and reserved function codes. The public
function codes are well defined function codes which are guaranteed to be unique. Some of
the most commonly used public function codes are the read and write operations of primary
tables and are shown in Table 2.2. The user-defined function codes are not supported by
the specification and are implemented by users. There is no guarantee that the use of
user-defined function codes will be unique. The reserved function codes are used by some
companies for legacy products and are not available for public use.
Primary Tables Object Type Type of Comments
Discrete Input Single bit Read-Only
This type of data can be provided
by an I/O system.
Coils Single bit Read-Write
This type of data can be altered
by an application program.
Input Registers 16-bit word Read-Only
This type of data can be provided
by an I/O system.
Holding Registers 16-bit word Read-Write
This type of data can be altered
by an application program.
Table 2.1: Data model of Modbus [23]
DNP3 [25], which represents the Distributed Network Protocol Version 3, is a standards-
based communications protocol used between components in industrial control systems such
as SCADA. To be more specific, DNP3 is responsible for the exchanging of data and control
commands between master and outstation. The term outstation denotes remote computers
in the field and the term master represents computers in the control centers. In SCADA,
MTU is a typical master computer and typical outstation computers include RTUs and
PLCs. Using DNP3, the master station issues control commands to outstation computers
and outstation computers gather data for transmission to the master. As it is shown in
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Code Name
01 Read Coils
02 Read Discrete Inputs
03 Read Holding Registers
04 Read Input Registers
05 Write Single Coil
06 Write Single Register
15 Write Multiple Coils
16 Write Multiple Registers
23 Read/Write Multiple Registers
Table 2.2: Commonly used public function codes in Modebus [24]
Figure 2.5, DNP3 is a layered protocol that is based on the Open Systems Interconnection
model (OSI model). DNP3 supports application layer, pseudo-transport layer, and data
link layer. The application layer bridges the DNP3 user’s code with the lower layers and
provides standardized functions and data formats for the efficient transmission of control
commands and data values. The pseudo-transport layer is responsible for disassembling large
application layer fragments into data-link-layer-sized units for transmission and reassembling
them back into the original application fragment on reception. The data link layer, lying
between the pseudo-transport layer and the physical media, provides station addressing,
data fragmentation, frame synchronization, link control, and error detection.
In Figure 2.5, the series of square blocks at the top of the outstation denotes the data
stored in its database and output devices. Each data type is structured as a separate array.
The binary input array contains states of physical or logical Boolean devices. The analog
input array contains analog input quantities that the outstation measured or computed.
The counter array contains ever increasing count values. The control output array contains
physical or logical on-off, raise-lower and trip-close points. The analog output array contains
physical or logical analog quantities such as those used for setpoints. As it is shown in Figure
2.5, the DNP3 master shares similar input data types including binary, analog and counter.
These values are used by the master for system state display, closed-loop control, alarm
notification, billing, etc.
Some of the most commonly used functions in DNP3 are listed in Table 2.3. For example,
let us consider read operations. The master’s user layer formulates its request for data
from the outstation by telling the application layer function code 1 to perform, and by
specifying the data types it wants from the outstation. The application layer then passes
the request down through the transport layer to the link layer that, in turn, sends the
message to the outstation. The link layer at the outstation checks the frames for errors
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Figure 2.5: Master–outstation relationship and layering of DNP3 [26]
and passes them up to the transport layer where the complete message is assembled in the
outstation’s application layer. The application layer then tells its user layer what data were
requested. Responses work similarly, in that, the outstation’s user layer fetches the desired
data and presents it to the application layer. Data is then passed downward, across the
communication channel and upward to the master’s user layer. Some outstations are also
able to spontaneously transmits a response without having received a specific request for the
data. These unsolicited responses are utilized to transmits changes at outstations as soon
as possible rather than waiting for another master station polling cycle. Also, whenever the
master receives an application layer fragment from an outstation, it sends a confirmation to
the corresponding outstation.
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In this thesis, I am considering Modbus on TCP. Therefore, both Modbus and DNP3 in
this thesis have a transport layer and an internet layer and rely on the TCP/IP protocol
suite.
Message Type Code Name Brief Description
Confirmation 0 CONFIRM
Master sends this to an outstation
to confirm the receipt of
an Application Layer fragment.
Request 1 READ
Outstation shall return the data
specified in the request.
Request 2 WRITE
Outstation shall store the data
specified in the request.
Response 129 RESPONSE
Master shall interpret this
fragment as a response to
a request sent by the master.
Response 130
UNSOLICITED
RESPONSE
Master shall interpret this fragment
as an unsolicited response that was
not prompted by an explicit request.
Table 2.3: Commonly used function codes in DNP3 [25]
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CHAPTER 3: OLAF: OPERATION-LEVEL TRAFFIC ANALYZER
FRAMEWORK FOR SCADA SYSTEM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As we mentioned in Section 1.1, for the Smart Grid SCADA systems nowadays, various
security mechanisms (e.g., firewalls and gateways) are applied to the boundary of the infras-
tructure to inspect and secure the information exchanged with external entities. However,
data within SCADA networks, gathered by the internal field measurement devices, is usually
not visible to the operators and not secured at the same security levels as communication
with external entities. Smart Grid wide-area networks connect Smart Grid substation field
networks with operational control centers, and these networks open possibilities for potential
attacks, unless they embed end-to-end security mechanisms and policies. Even if we secure
communication paths, insider attacks are possible due to spear phishing, USB, network-
based malware proliferation [17], etc. As a result, it is a must for the utilities to go beyond
guarding the external boundary of Smart Grid SCADA networks and begin inspecting and
protecting internal Smart Grid SCADA networks at all levels.
To provide end-to-end security in the network system, both the end host devices and the
network need to be secured. In general purpose network such as the Internet, the end hosts
usually have their own security analysis and protection mechanism. Therefore, the analyzers
designed for general purpose network [27, 28, 29, 30] only need to provide network analysis
capability, i.e., flow/packet or application level traffic analysis. In Smart Grid SCADA
network, the end hosts are control centers and field controllers such as Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). Since the field controllers are
resource-constrained devices which do not have enough memory and computing resources to
support the addition of security capabilities [17], the control centers are usually responsible
for both the device status analysis and network traffic analysis. In the current architecture,
data, collected by the measurement devices, is transmitted to the control center for processing
and analysis. As the number of deployed measurement devices grows, it is increasingly
harder for the current architecture to satisfy the real-time needs of protection and control
applications. Therefore, the current Smart Grid SCADA networks cannot provide up-to-date
situational awareness to the power grid operators. However, supervising device functionality,
detecting networking anomalies and preventing potential problems in substations, all rely
on situational awareness. The lack of up-to-date situational awareness may result in huge
losses during security breaches.
Our approach to the problem in Smart Grid SCADA networks is the design of an edge-
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based, extensible, and efficient operation-level traffic analyzer, called OLAF, that has the
capabilities of both flow-level network traffic analysis and operation-level device status anal-
ysis. OLAF is able to collect, aggregate and analyze the statistics in network packets from
both the flow level for network traffic analysis and the operation level for device status anal-
ysis. For network traffic analysis in the flow level, OLAF is able to track which two hosts
are communicating. For device status analysis in the operation level, the analyzer is able to
track status information of the utilized industrial control systems protocols (e.g., Modbus
and DNP3), ongoing operations (e.g., read or write), and the targets of those operations(e.g.,
indexes of coils or registers that carry values of the operation). OLAF collects, aggregates
and stores these meta data statistics in efficient data structure. Then, it inspects those
aggregated data to perform anomaly detection.
We deploy OLAF close to the end hosts in the edge of SCADA network to provide up-
to-date situational awareness of network traffic and operational device status to the power
operator. OLAF provides the situational awareness by promptly extracting, aggregating,
displaying and analyzing the control information in network packet headers as well as the
encapsulated data. By providing both network and device analysis ability close to field
controllers, we are able to give the power operator more up-to-date view of the whole system
and warn them of potential breaches more promptly.
This chapter is structured as follows: We review the related work in Section 3.2. In
Section 3.3, we introduce the network architecture of the Smart Grid control systems and
describe the design challenges and our approaches. In Section 3.4, we present an overview
of the analyzer design. Both time overhead and performance evaluation of OLAF is shown
in Section 3.5 and we conclude the chapter in Section 3.6.
3.2 RELATED WORK
Traffic analyzer is the main approach to provide network traffic analysis for general purpose
networks. There are many works [27, 28, 29, 30] aimed at designing network profiler and
traffic analyzer. However, to our knowledge, none of the existing analyzers for general
purpose networks provide operation-level device analysis. And operation-level device analysis
is crucial to Smart Grid SCADA networks, since compromised devices can send malicious
operations or fake measurement data which could cause huge damage to the entire system.
There are also works that build analyzers for SCADA systems. Different approaches
include traffic filtering systems [31, 32], Bloom-filter-based/model-base/machine-learning-
based intrusion detection [33, 34, 35, 36], SCADA Intelligence Gateway [37] and a fine
grained analysis of packet content [38]. Our work differs from theirs in that instead of just
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extracting and analyzing all the features separately, we factor the features into multiple
levels and store our statistics in a tree structure. We have also designed a threshold-based
anomaly detection algorithm utilizing the tree structure. The tree structure not only allows
us to efficiently store and access the statistics, but also gives us the ability to easily change
the granularity of our analysis and inspection.
3.3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the Smart Grid network architecture. Then we describe
the design problems of the analyzer together with our approaches.
3.3.1 Network Architecture
The simplified network architecture of Smart Grid SCADA system [17] is shown in Figure
3.1. The communications are between the MTU in the control center and field controllers
within the substations. The field controllers are PLCs and RTUs which are further connected
to sensor and actuators. They forward data measurements to control centers and receive
control commands from control centers. The control center, on the other hand, is responsible
for processing the forwarded data and issuing control commands.
Figure 3.1: Smart Grid SCADA network architecture and OLAF
To perform analysis of the Smart Grid SCADA network traffic and device status, our
analyzers are placed at the boundary of the WAN at both control center and substation
ends, as it is shown in Figure 3.1. To be more specific, the uplink of the substation switch
is connected to the input interface of the analyzer and the output interface is connected to
the input of the router, making the analyzer inline to all communications. A similar type
of connection is done also on the other side at the control center. Once the analyzers are
physically connected inline, all traffic that was previously being communicated now transits
through the analyzer and is subject to inspection and analysis.
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3.3.2 Design Challenge
While designing the analyzer, there are many challenges we need to deal with. Two of
them are crucial to our analyzer and are discussed as follows:
• Extensibility1: As the Smart Grid SCADA networks evolve, smarter devices and new
industrial control protocols are deployed. Designing the analyzer to be easily extensible
to handle new operations of new devices using new protocols is of great importance.
The software design concept, modularity, is our approach to this problem. OLAF is
constructed by different modules with different functionalities (e.g., collection, aggre-
gation, analysis). To support the analysis of new operations from new protocols, we
can simply update corresponding modules or add new modules instead of redesigning
the entire analyzer.
• Efficiency : Since OLAF is going to deal with real-time traffic in the Smart Grid
SCADA network and provide prompt analysis and inspection of the packet, time ef-
ficiency is crucial to our analyzer. The collection of statistics needs to be done at
the communication line speed and the analysis also needs to be done fast enough to
be meaningful to power grid operators. To be efficient, the analyzer should collect
sufficient amount of statistics at the minimum cost. We achieve this by factoring the
statistics into multiple levels and adjusting the number of used levels according to
requirements of metadata accuracy as well as time and storage overhead.
3.4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the analyzer system design. The modular struc-
ture of OLAF is shown in Figure 3.2. OLAF consists of 4 modules: (1)Statistics Collector,
(2)Statistics Aggregator, (3)Anomaly Detector, (4)Pattern-based Identity Recognizer.
Figure 3.2: Modular Structure of OLAF
1Here we only discuss the extensibility to new functionalities.
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The Statistics Collector examines the network packets and collects the flow-level and
operation-level statistics needed by the network traffic and device status analysis. It then
provides the inputs for the Statistics Aggregator and the Pattern-based Identity Recognizer.
The Statistics Aggregator aggregates the statistics and sends them to the Anomaly Detector
for further analysis and anomaly detection. The Pattern-based Identity Recognizer identifies
the type of the traffic source and destination by monitoring certain request and response
patterns in the statistics provided by the Statistics Collector. The four modules will be
described in more detail in the following subsections.
3.4.1 Statistics Collector
For each network packet that goes into the collector, there are 6 levels of statistics we want
to collect, which are shown in Table 3.1. Levels 1-2 are flow-level statistics that are used for
network traffic analysis, while levels 3-6 are operation-level statistics that are used for device
status analysis. Note that not all 6 levels of statistics necessarily exist for each packet. For
example, a transport control packet (e.g., TCP ACK) does not have an industrial control
protocol (e.g., Modbus) header and only has the upper two levels (e.g., levels 1 and 2) of
the statistics. On the other hand, a Modbus request packet to read a specific register has all
6 levels of statistics. Another thing worth noticing is that the Unit ID (UID) is a protocol
specific additional address used to differentiate aggregated data or devices that do not have
IP addresses. For example, the substation could aggregate the measurement data from IEDs
and the control center will communicate with the substation instead of each IED to collect
those data. In this case, all the packets will have IP addresses of the control center and
the substation. To differentiate data from different IEDs, the power operator will assign
different additional addresses to each IED and use those as identifiers.
Level Subject
1 Sender of the packet
2 Receiver of the packet
3 Protocol that the packet uses for industrial control (e.g., Modbus or DNP3)
4 Unit ID (UID) that is used by the protocol to identify different devices
5 Function (e.g., read or write) that the packet conducts in its protocol
6 Target of the function (e.g., which coil or register)
Table 3.1: 5 levels of statistics
In the Statistic Collector, each packet header will go through three metadata extractors
in order. The three extractors will extract the statistics of levels {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5} and
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6, respectively. The first extractor is a general one which extracts sender and receiver
information. The other two, on the other hand, are protocol and device specific and are
responsible for extracting {protocol, UID, function} and target, respectively. Currently, we
have extractors for two industrial control protocols, DNP3 and Modbus. An item gen event
will be triggered after the packet is processed by the last extractor, which contains all the
statistics extracted by the current and all former extractors. Consider an example of a
control center with IP 1.2.3.4 sending periodic Modbus read coils requests to a substation
with IP 4.3.2.1. The control center sends the request once per minute and tries to read
coil 1 from device with UID of 2. After the request packet header goes through the OLAF
collector, the extractors extract the sender of 1.2.3.4, the receiver of 4.3.2.1, the protocol
of Modbus, the UID of 2, the function of READ COILS, and target of 1. Note that if
new operations in new protocols need to be supported, only the last two extractors need
to be updated. All the other parts can remain exactly the same, which provides significant
extensibility to the analyzer.
A useful feature of our analyzer is that users can easily scale the number of levels of
statistics to collect. If the user is only interested in the flow-level information, the analyzer
can be configured into a general network analyzer by only collecting the upper two levels
of statistics. This can largely speed up the collector and make the analyzer more efficient,
since the packet needs to go through the first extractor only instead of all three in this
case. If operation-level statistics is required, the analyzer collects all 6 levels of statistics
and provides the capabilities of device status analysis and network traffic analysis.
3.4.2 Statistics Aggregator
The Statistics Aggregator aggregates the information of each packet and constructs a tree
structure Treenew to store the aggregated statistics. Each tree structure Treenew corresponds
to statistics aggregated over certain period of time Tp and each node corresponds to statistics
of a specific kind of packets. An example of the data structure is shown in Figure 3.3.
Each node (leaf and internal) in the tree includes the following fields: (1)Info string IS,
(2)Accumulated info string AIS, (3)Packet count PC, (4)Average byte AB, (5)Response
ratio RR (function level node only), (6)Response delay RD (function level node only). IS
is the value of the corresponding statistics level. For example, IS of sender level is its IP
address and IS of function level is the function name. AIS of a node, on the other hand,
is constructed by ISes of nodes on the path from the root to itself. And the node stores
statistical data of the kind of packets represented by its AIS. For example, the node labelled
“G1” in Figure 3.3 has an AIS of “S1−R1−P1−F1−G1” and therefore stands for packets
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that sender S1 sends to receiver R1 using protocol P1 with function F1 performed on target
G1. The other four fields are data fields used to store statistical data of that kind of packets
corresponding to the node during that period Tp. PC is the total number of the packets,
while AB is the average size in bytes of the packets. RR and RD only exist for function
level nodes and are the ratio of responded request functions and the delay of the response,
respectively.
Figure 3.3: Statistics structure
In the workflow of the Statistic Aggregator, the item gen event is fed into an item counter,
which gets the information about the packet in the event and updates the corresponding
nodes’ date fields. There is also an aggregator which runs every period Tp, aggregating
the results during that period as well as constructing the statistics structure. After the
aggregator finishes the aggregation and construction, it triggers an aggre finish event which
includes the tree structure Treenew of that period. This event could be used for further
analysis of the statistics of the network traffic such as anomaly detection which will be
introduced in the following subsection.
3.4.3 Anomaly Detector
The Anomaly Detector is responsible for triggering alarms when anomalous traffic is seen
in the network. There are mainly two approaches for intrusion detection: specification-base
and anomaly-based. Although the anomaly-based approach has the ability to detect novel
attacks, the difficulty of modelling the normal behaviour and the high false positive rate
prevent it from widespread use. However, it is shown that the network traffic in SCADA
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systems shows much more regularity than traffic in general purpose network [38]. There-
fore, the anomaly-based approach is ideal for intrusion detection in Smart Grid SCADA
networks. Our current anomaly detector uses the anomaly-based approach. Specifically, it
utilizes a threshold-based algorithm, named Normal Tree. The core idea of the algorithm
is constructing a ‘normal’ tree Treek which represents the normal traffic and using it as a
baseline. The next tree, constructed by the Statistic Aggregator, Treenew is then compared
to the baseline to detect any potential anomaly.
The algorithm has two phases: initialization phase and anomaly detection phase. In
the trusted initialization phase, which is the first k periods with total length of kTp, the
algorithm just merges the k trees and constructs the normal tree Treek. The structure of
the normal tree Treek is similar to Treenew except that we store a mean value µ and a
standard deviation value σ for each statistic field (PC, AB, RR, RD) in each node. So
each node has IS, AIS, (µPC, σPC), (µAB, σAB) (and additionally (µRR, σRR), (µRD, σRD)
for function level nodes).
Algorithm 3.1 Normal Tree Algorithm
procedure AnomalyDetect(Treenew, T reek, θ)
Traverse Treenew in pre-order.
for each node N in Treenew: do
if N also exists in Treek then
Use Equation 3.1 to calculate AS for each data field of N and compare them
with θ. Continue to traverse N ’s children.
else if N does not exist in Treek then
Assign AS = 1 to N instead of each data field and compare it with θ. Stop
traversing N ’s children.
end if
end for
Traverse Treek in pre-order.
for each node N in Treek: do
if N does not exist in Treenew then
Create a dummy node N with all data fields set to zero. Then use Equation 3.1
to calculate AS for each data field and compare them with θ. Stop traversing
N ’s children.
end if
end for
end procedure
In the anomaly detection phase, we compare Treenew with Treek. One node N in Treenew
is considered to be the “same” with another in Treek if they have the same AIS. To compare
the two same nodes in two trees, we assign anomaly scores to each data field of them. Suppose
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the field in Treenew has a value of X and the corresponding field in Treek has value µ and
σ. Utilizing the Chebyshev’s inequality, we define anomaly score AS as follows:
AS(X, µ, σ) =
1− σ
2
|X−µ|2
if |X − µ| > σ
0 otherwise
(3.1)
The anomaly score is in the range [0, 1] and a higher score represents more abnormal behavior.
The algorithm then compares the score with a predefined threshold θ and decides whether to
trigger an alarm or not. The anomaly detection phase of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm
3.1.
Consider our previous example of periodic read coils requests. Suppose this is the only
traffic in the network and the substation never responds. We choose Tp = 10min, k = 10 and
θ = 0.5. The normal tree Treek is represented by Root1− S1−R1− P1−U1− F1−G1. All
nodes have data fields (µPC, θPC) = (10, 0), (µAB, θAB) = (64, 0) and F1 has additional data
field (µRR, θRR) = (0, 0). Now suppose the control center starts to send write coil requests
instead of read coils requests to the same device and target at the same frequency. The next
Treenew is represented by Root2 − S2 − R2 − P2 − U2 − F2 − G2. The algorithm traverses
Treek and Treenew simultaneously in pre-order. It first finds that Root1 and Root2 have
the equal AIS and therefore are same nodes. The calculated AS for both PC and AB are
zeros, which are less than θ = 0.5. Hence the algorithm does not trigger any alarm and
continues to compare their children. Similarly, the algorithm compares S1 with S2, R1 with
R2, P1 with P2, U1 with U2 in order and triggers no alarm. Then the algorithm finds that
no node in Treek has the same AIS with that of F2, so it assigns AS = 1 to F2. Since
AS = 1 > 0.5 = θ, it triggers an alarm. The algorithm also finds that no node in Treenew
has the same AIS with that of F1, so it creates a dummy node F0 with all data fields set to
zero and compares F0 with F1. ASPC = ASAB = 1 > 0.5 = θ, hence the algorithm triggers
two alarms.
The most criticized issue with the anomaly-based approach is the high false positive rate.
There are three parameters in our analyzer that we can increase to reduce false positives:
period time Tp, number of training periods k, and the anomaly score threshold θ. But they
need to be carefully tuned since there are trade-offs and restrictions. Because we only detect
anomalies at the end of each period, the period time Tp decides the maximum anomaly
detection delay! We need to keep it small to provide prompt detection! A longer training
phase has a larger training cost, and makes it harder to keep the training set clean. Increasing
the threshold will make the detection algorithm less sensitive, which might decrease the
detection rate. OLAF also has a feedback loop between the anomaly detector and the power
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grid operator. If the operator finds one alarm to be false positive, he or she can give feedback
to the detector so that the detector can adapt to avoid the same mistake. Our current naive
feedback mechanism just increases the standard deviation in the corresponding data field in
the normal tree. More sophisticated methods will be explored in the future work.
3.4.4 Pattern-based Identity Recognizer
The objective of the Pattern-based Identity Recognizer is to identify the device type of
the traffic source and/or destination by monitoring certain request and response patterns in
the traffic statistics.
The recognizer consists of a request-response coupler and a recognition rule matcher. The
request-response coupler analyzes the packet statistics in the item gen event. Based on
the statistics, it couples each pair of request and response and constructs a variable which
consists of the protocol and both the request and response function codes. For each pair of
request and response, this variable is checked by the recognition rule matcher to see whether
it matches the function pairs given by the recognition rules or not. If a match is found, the
identities of the requester and/or the responder are also given by the corresponding matched
rule and output by the matcher.
3.5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation of OLAF in terms of time overhead and detection
ability. We use a network analysis framework, called Bro [39], to implement our analyzer.
All experiments run on a simulated Modbus trace set. The trace set was generated by a
traffic simulator created by domain expert from Information Trust Institute at Illinois. The
trace set includes a baseline traffic flow and some injected anomalies. In the baseline traffic,
one Modbus master (control center) sends periodic operations to 10 Modbus slaves (field
controllers). The valid operations in the baseline traffic and the frequencies of them are
shown in Table 3.2.
3.5.1 Time Overhead Evaluation
Since our analyzer is inline to all traffic going through, we need to evaluate its processing
time overhead to make sure it can handle real time traffic. We run OLAF on a 64-bit Ubuntu
machine with 8 Intel i7-2600 3.40GHZ CPUs and 3.7GiB memory. In each of the following
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Operation Function code Frequency
Read Coils 01 Every 5 seconds
Read Discrete Inputs 02 Every 5 seconds
Read Holding Registers 03 Every 5 seconds
Read Input Registers 04 Every 5 seconds
Write Single Coil 05 Every 30 seconds
Write Single Register 06 Every 30 seconds
Write Multiple Coils 15 Every 5 minutes
Write Multiple Registers 16 Every hour
Table 3.2: Frequencies of valid operations in the baseline traffic
experiments, we run the corresponding modules on the same trace set for 5 rounds and take
the average.
For the Statistics Collector, we measure the processing time of each individual packet and
define it to be the total runtime of the collector. For the Traffic Statistics Counter, we are
interested in the item process time and the aggregation time. Item process time is the time
for the item counter to process the item gen event and update the corresponding date fields
and is measured per item seen event. Aggregation time, which is measured per aggregation
period, is the time for the aggregator to aggregate the data fields and construct the current
tree structure. For the Anomaly Detector, the time to run the Normal Tree algorithm for one
period is denoted by the anomaly detection time. Note that the total real-time processing
time of each packet is the sum of collector runtime and item process time. And since the
aggregation and anomaly detection is only done once for each aggregation period, they are
not subject to the real-time overhead requirement.
Figure 3.4 shows the above four kinds of time overhead with different number of levels
and aggregation period time. We can see that even if we collect statistics from all 6 levels,
the total real-time processing time of each packet is still below 350 µs. And this is short
enough for the packets to be processed in communication line speed. Moreover, Tp does
not affect the aggregation time and anomaly detection time much since the traffic follows
certain patterns. Most importantly, reducing the number of levels has a significant effect
on the decrease of the time overhead of different modules. Therefore, always using the least
necessary number of levels can save non-negligible amount of time and produces the highest
processing speed. In this way, efficiency can be achieved by the analyzer.
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(a) Collector runtime (b) Item process time
(c) Aggregation time (d) Anomaly detection time
Figure 3.4: Time overhead with different levels and aggregation period
3.5.2 Detection Ability Evaluation
To evaluate OLAF’s anomaly detection ability, we inject anomalies in different levels to the
baseline traffic. The injected anomalies are listed in Table 3.3. We fix the period time Tp to
be 10 minutes and the anomaly detection phase to be 6 hours, and change the training phase
length k and anomaly score threshold θ. We also evaluate the analyzer in both feedback off
and on situations. OLAF is able to detect all nine anomalies in all cases, which means it
never miss any anomaly. And we define ratio of number of false alarms to number of total
node checked to be false alarm rate. The false alarm rate in different cases are listed in Table
3.4. We can see that increasing training time and anomaly score threshold both reduce false
positives. And the feedback loop also has a huge effect on decreasing the false positive rate.
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Level Injected anomaly
Flow level
Add one new Modbus master to send a set of operations to one
Modbus slave
Drop one Modbus slave
Send a bunch of ICMP packets to one Modbus slave
Increase the response delay of one Modbus slave from 30ms to
200ms
Increase the packet drop rate of one Modbus slave from 0 to 30%
Operation level
Stop sending some operations to one Modbus slave
Send several new operations to one Modbus slave
Change the sending frequency of some operations for one Modbus
slave
Change the targets of one operation for one Modbus slave
Table 3.3: Injected anomalies
Training Time 4 hours 8 hours
Feedback Off On Off On
Threshold θ
0.9 4.16% 1.07% 3.01% 0.86%
0.99 2.35% 0.62% 0.10% 0.06%
0.999 2.26% 0.56% 0.05% 0.03%
Table 3.4: False alarm rate with different parameters
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we present an extensible and efficient operation-level traffic analyzer frame-
work, called OLAF, for Smart Grid SCADA networks to provide network traffic analysis and
device status analyses. By collecting, aggregating and analyzing statistics in both flow level
and operation level on the communication within the internal network, OLAF increases the
situation awareness and security of the control system. Our results are strongly encouraging
to place the extensible and efficient analyzer in Smart Grid SCADA networks.
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CHAPTER 4: ISAAC: INTELLIGENT SYNCHROPHASOR DATA
REAL-TIME COMPRESSION FRAMEWORK FOR WAMS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Recently in Smart Grid, Wide-Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) are becoming more and
more widely accepted because of their ability to monitor, protect and control power systems
over large areas in real time. WAMS’s capability to support real-time decision-making
applications is based on the high reporting rates and precise time synchronization provided
by the new data acquisition technology of phasor measurement. Allowed by the emerging
and development of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), frequency, current, and voltage
can be measured at a rate of 30 Hz or higher, much faster than in the conventional SCADA
systems, where samples are taken only every few seconds. The generated measurements are
called synchrophasors, namely synchronized phasors, since they contain both magnitudes
and phase angles, and are precisely time-synchronized by the Global Positioning System
(GPS) technology. The synchrophasors generated by PMUs over wide-area power systems
can serve as snapshots of the system status and can be further utilized for real-time wide-area
monitoring, protection, and control. For instance, PMU data can aid or gradually replace
the state estimation process which is a key function in supervisory control of power grids,
since the accurate status information of the grid can be directly acquired from the real-time
synchrophasors.
Since PMUs have very high sampling rates and usually multiple data channels, the volume
of measurements collected is huge. 100 PMUs of 20 measurements, each running at 30 Hz,
will generate over 50 GB of data per day [40]. 3500 data channels of 34 PMUs running
at 100 Hz in Southwest China produce over 120 GB of data per day [41]. As the scale of
power systems and WAMS grows, the number of PMUs is also growing rapidly to provide
finer-grained global state of the more volatile power systems. For instance, the deployment
of PMUs in North America has largely increased from only 200 research-grade PMUs in
2009 to almost 1700 production-grade PMUs in 2014 [42]. Besides the number of PMUs, the
number of measurements at each PMU is also growing as more grid parameters get included
for monitoring, from several synchrophasors to tens of them. Due to the higher sampling
rate of modern PMUs, the increase in the number of PMUs and measurements per PMU,
we can surely expect a multi-fold expansion in the already large volumes of synchrophasor
data in WAMS.
The synchrophasor data generated by PMUs need to be transmitted in the underlying
communication systems in real time and stored in control centers for archive purpose (his-
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torian). The huge and ever-increasing volume of synchrophasor data introduces tremendous
storage and bandwidth capacity requirement for WAMS. Therefore, it is necessary to use
data compression techniques to lighten the heavy burden on the storage and communication
systems. Many works of power data compression focus on the compression for storage or
oﬄine bulk transmission [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49]. However, we argue that online data
compression for real-time transmission should be addressed as much, if not more, than oﬄine
compression. If not handled carefully, the huge data volume in the communication system
could result in frequent and severe congestion. The WAMS applications and even the situ-
ational awareness of the entire system could suffer a lot from the extremely long delays or
high packet loss rates that follow the congestion.
The two main challenges for designing real-time compression frameworks in WAMS are as
follows:
• Delay : The data should be compressed in a real-time manner. In other words, the
delay matters. Most existing compression techniques use large sampling windows to
achieve better compression performance, which is a luxury that real-time compression
techniques cannot afford.
• Disturbance: The delay and accuracy requirements of data during disturbance1 are
different from those in normal status. Thus it is necessary to treat disturbance data
and normal data differently in compression, which requires the early detection of dis-
turbances to be incorporated into the compression framework.
In this work, we propose an intelligent synchrophasor data real-time compression frame-
work named ISAAC to be deployed at the edge of WAMS. Combining the Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), ISAAC has the capability of
largely improving the efficiency of communication and storage systems via data compression
while maintaining strong data fidelity. A disturbance detector allows ISAAC to differentiate
normal and disturbance data and process them in different ways. Two core techniques, which
are the transformation matrix reuse in PCA and the self-adapt principal component number
selection, allows ISAAC to achieve a good compression ratio (CR) without introducing an
impractical delay.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the related work.
Section 4.3 provides some background and explains the two compression algorithms used by
our approach. Section 4.4 describes the design of ISAAC. Section 4.5 shows the performance
evaluation of time, CR, and accuracy and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
1Disturbances here means transients in measurements that may be caused by misoperations, faults,
topology changes, load and source dynamics.
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4.2 RELATED WORK
Data compression techniques can be categorized into lossless compression and lossy com-
pression in general. There are many works [43, 44, 45] focusing on lossless compression of
power quality data, smart meter data, and PMU data. Our work, on the contrary, focuses
on lossy compression, since lossy compression has a potential to achieve a better CR com-
pared with lossless compression and it is acceptable as long as parameters of compression
algorithms are selected carefully to maintain information loss within required bound.
Among all the works using lossy compression techniques for PMU data, most of them
[46, 47, 48, 49] perform compression for storage or oﬄine bulk transmission purpose, in which
cases the delay of the compressed data is not a concern. Therefore, they are able to use a
sampling window with the length of 10 seconds or longer to gather enough data and compress
the entire data block to achieve better CRs. For sampling window based approaches, the
earliest set of measurements in each window needs to wait for the entire window to be filled
before it can be compressed and sent. Hence, a window size of 10 seconds means a delay
of more than 10 seconds for the earliest set of measurements in each data block, which is
far beyond the delay constraints of most of the real-time WAMS applications [50, 51]. As a
result, compression techniques for PMU data storage or oﬄine transmission are not directly
applicable to real-time PMU data compression purpose.
A semantics-aware real-time data transmission reduction method is proposed in [52]. Grid
applications consuming PMU data are modelled as continuous threshold queries and relevant
data are delivered only when the threshold condition is broken. The drawback of this
approach is not all applications can be modeled in their way and absence of detailed data
during normal status will definitely impair the system’s ability to conduct monitoring and
detailed analysis of the data.
Another real-time data compression technique is presented in [41], combining exception
compression with swing door trending compression. Each sequence of measurements of each
PMU is compressed separately by only keeping the data with essential and effective infor-
mation. The problem with this approach is that the correlation between multiple sequences
of measurements in multiple PMUs is not utilized. And since this technique needs to be
installed on each PMU, the deployment cost is high considering the large quantity of PMUs.
4.3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the generic WAMS architecture and the phasor data
concentration. Then we introduce two compression techniques we use.
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4.3.1 WAMS Architecture
A generic architecture of WAMS consists of four main components: (1) PMU, (2) Phasor
Data Concentrator (PDC), (3) WAMS Applications, (4) underlying Communication Network
to connect the above three [53]. A simplified, multi-layered architecture of WAMS is shown
in Figure 4.1. In Layer 1, the PMUs are installed in power system substations to measure
the connected bus bars or power lines. The synchrophasor measurements from the PMUs
are then transmitted via Local Area Networks (LAN) or Wide Area Networks (WAN) to
Layer 2, where they are concentrated and sorted by the PDCs. After that, the time-aligned
measurements are forwarded via WAN to the control center in Layer 3 and usually further
concentrated by the PDC there before finally consumed by the WAMS applications.
Figure 4.1: WAMS architecture
Our real-time compression technique, ISAAC, resides in the PDCs in Layer 2. We further
divide the architecture into two scenarios: (1) LAN-WAN scenario, where the Layer-2 PDC
locates in the substation and connects to the PMUs via LAN; (2) WAN-WAN scenario,
where the Layer-2 PDC collects measurements from multiple substations and connects to
the PMUs via WAN.
4.3.2 Phasor Data Concentration
As the key component of the WAMS architecture, PDC’s core function is to combine
synchrophasor measurements from more than one PMUs into a single time-synchronized
data stream for further processing [54]. More specifically, it collects and sorts measurements
from all connected PMUs according to their timestamps. Measurements with the same
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timestamp are encapsulated into one packet and forwarded to the control center. Since not
all measurements arrive at the same time, PDC needs to wait and eventually timeout to
mitigate the delay. The entire process is called time alignment and can be categorized into
absolute-time-based and relative-time-based time alignment [54]. For real-time monitoring,
protection and control applications, time alignment to absolute time reference is preferred
since it can provide better delay guarantees. Therefore, we will only consider and introduce
time alignment to absolute time reference here.
An example of phasor data concentration with time alignment to absolute time is shown
in Figure 4.2. At a certain rate (e.g., 60Hz), measurements with timestamps are produced
by synchronized PMUs. The countdown to the timeout starts at the time specified by
each timestamp. As it is shown in the figure, there are two potential scenarios: (1) All
measurements with timestamp T1 arrive before the timeout and the complete data set is
forwarded before the timeout; (2) Not all measurement with timestamp T2 arrive before the
timeout and the incomplete data set without measurement from PMU3 is forwarded at the
end of the timeout. Note that the processing time of PDC is omitted in this example for
simplicity reason.
Figure 4.2: Example of phasor data concentration with time alignment to absolute time [55]
Phasor data concentration is only the core function of the PDC. Since the PDC is an edge
device that phasor measurements reach before they are further forwarded to the control
center, more and more functions are being placed at the PDC including data handling,
processing, and storage [54]. And it is also a perfect location to deploy our intelligent
synchrophasor data real-time compression framework.
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4.3.3 Principal Component Analysis
As a commonly used linear dimensionality reduction technique, PCA [56] is a mathe-
matical procedure that uses an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations
of possibly correlated variables into a set of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal
components (PCs).
Consider an m× n data matrix X containing n set of samples from m PMUs2 expressed
as
X =

x11 x12 . . . x1n
x21 x22 . . . x2n
...
...
. . .
...
xm1 xm2 . . . xmn
 . (4.1)
xij represents the jth measurement from the ith PMU. The PCA method starts by calcu-
lating the covariance matrix as C = XXT ∈ Rm×m. Since C is a square symmetric matrix,
it can be orthogonally (orthonormally) diagonalized as
C = EDET , (4.2)
where E is an m×m orthonormal matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of C, namely
PCs, and D is an m×m diagonal matrix with the corresponding eigenvalues as the diagonal
entries. The eigenvalues can also represent the variance explained by each PC and are sorted
in descending order. PCA performs dimensionality reduction by preserving only a subset of
PCs which explain most of the variance of the original data. Assume the first r out of the
m PCs are selected. Let E(r) represent the left most r columns of E. The transformation
matrix is selected as P = E(r)T ∈ Rr×m and the dimension reduced matrix is expressed as
Y = PX ∈ Rr×n. Let λi represent the eigenvalue (variance), associated with the ith PC,
the total variance explained by Y is defined as
Γ(r) =
∑r
i=1 λi∑m
i=1 λi
. (4.3)
Usually, we want to select r s.t. Γ(r) is greater or equal to a variance threshold γ.
Although the core idea of dimensionality reduction by PCA is the same as above, there
are various implementations of the method. In this work, we use two implementations:
The first one (we name it PCA-D) utilizes the sklearn.decomposition.PCA [57] implementa-
2There are usually multiple measurements from each PMU. So the actual number of rows is larger than
the number of PMUs. But we assume m rows here for simplicity.
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tion and cannot work with sparse matrix; the second one (we name it PCA-S) utilizes the
sklearn.decomposition.TruncatedSVD [57] implementation and can preserve the sparsity of
the matrix.
4.3.4 Discrete Cosine Transform
DCT [58] transforms a sequence of data points of length n to a domain of n cosine basis
functions. The transformed data are the coefficients of the basis functions. Some of the
coefficients have small magnitudes and thus can be discarded without sacrificing much ac-
curacy. We use DCT implemented in scipy.fftpack.dct [59] to further compress each row of
the dimension reduced matrix Y in the previous section. Similar to the previous section, let
ci represent the coefficient with the ith largest magnitude. If l out of all the n coefficients
are kept, the cumulative energy kept can be expressed as:
E(l) =
∑l
i=1 ci∑n
i=1 ci
(4.4)
Similar to Γ(r), E(l) is used to select proper l value. In this work, we select the smallest l
that satisfies E(l) > 0.8.
4.4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the design of ISAAC. The workflow of ISAAC
is described in Figure 4.3. There are four main components utilized in ISAAC: (1) Buffer
which buffers all the measurements have not been sent, (2) Time Alignment Component
which time-aligns the most recent set of measurements with an absolute timeout, (3) Dis-
turbance Detector which decides whether there are disturbances happening, (4) Compressor
which compresses the input matrix based on PCA and DCT. Among the four components,
the buffer and the time alignment component are the built-in functions of PDCs. The dis-
turbance detector and the compressor, on the other hand, are the core parts of ISAAC and
are the focus of this section.
In Figure 4.3, ~xi is a column vector containing all the received measurements from all
PMUs corresponding to time index i. The buffer serves as the sampling window and buffers
all the received stream measurements with time index k or larger. ~xk represents the earliest
unsent data set and ~xn represents the earliest unprocessed data set. Periodically, the time
alignment component aligns the measurements in the buffer based on their timestamps
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Figure 4.3: Workflow of ISAAC
and forwards ~xn to the disturbance detector
3. The disturbance detector processes ~xn and
outputs the estimated status (normal or disturbance) of the system. In normal status,
ISAAC further compares the current window size from k to n with the maximum sampling
window size K. If n − k + 1 = K, all measurements buffered from k to n, i.e. matrix
[~xk, · · · , ~xn], are forwarded to the compressor and compressed. Otherwise, ISAAC waits
for more measurements (longer sampling window) to compress. In disturbance status, ~xn is
directly sent without compression. If there are buffered measurements besides ~xn, i.e. matrix
[~xk, · · · , ~xn−1] is not empty, then they are forwarded to the compressor for compression. If
the compressor is called, no matter in which status, the compressed results are sent. k is
updated to n+ 1 as long as something is sent, which means the measurements in the buffer
before but not including time index n + 1 are cleared. And n is always increased by one
after each period.
There are five kinds of measurements we consider in this work: Frequency (f), Voltage
Magnitude (vm), Voltage Angle (va), Current Magnitude (im), and Current Angle (ia).
The following two subsections describe the disturbance detector and the compressor in more
detail.
3There could be missing data points in ~xn and in the input matrix of the compressor. We fill in each
missing data point by its current mean and record it by a boolean. We omit this process in the workflow for
simplicity.
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4.4.1 Disturbance Detector
The main purpose of the disturbance detector is to differentiate the normal status and
the disturbance status of the system. Intuitively, a higher delay and lower accuracy are
tolerable in normal status, whereas measurements should be collected as soon as possible
during disturbances and higher fidelity is necessary to preserve the important information
in the measurements. Since the requirements for delay and accuracy are different in the two
status, it is worth differentiating them and handle them in different ways. Our disturbance
detector implements a modified version of a relatively simple statistical change detection
algorithm [48] for computation power and delay consideration.
According to PRC-002-2 by NERC [60], the recommended disturbance triggering criteria
include: (1) frequency < 59.75 Hz or > 61 Hz, (2) rate of change of frequency < 0.03125
Hz/s or > 0.125 Hz/s, 3) Undervoltage trigger set no lower than 85% of the normal operating
voltage for a duration of 5 seconds. However, as it is pointed out in [61, 48], these values are
too conservative to detect all potential disturbances and preserve all critical information.
Similar to [61], we select stricter triggering criteria as percentage deviation of θvm = 1%
for voltage and θf = 0.1% for frequency. These values could be tuned if necessary without
affecting the algorithm itself.
Since the disturbance triggering criteria are based on frequency and voltage magnitude
only, the disturbance detector only processes those two kinds of measurements. The workflow
is shown in Figure 4.4. First of all, the current status is checked and there could be two
scenarios: (1) The system is in the normal status; (2) The system is in the disturbance status.
In the first scenario, for each i ∈ 1 . . .m, the deviation δi(n) = |xin − µi(n)| is calculated,
where µi(n) =
1
K
∑n−1
j=n−K xij is the current mean. If all the percentage deviations are smaller
than the triggering threshold, namely δi(n)/µi(n) < θ for all i ∈ 1 . . .m, no disturbance is
detected and the normal status remains. Otherwise, status is changed to disturbance and
the disturbance count is set to 1. In the second scenario, we assume a disturbance will last
for at least 3 periods. So if the disturbance count is smaller than 3, the disturbance status
remains and the count is increased by 1. Otherwise, for each i ∈ 1 . . .m, a special standard
deviation of the most recent 3 periods are calculated as σi(n) =
√
1
3
∑n
j=n−2(xij − µi(n))
2.
If all the percentage standard deviations are smaller than the triggering threshold, namely
σi(n)/µi(n) < θ for all i ∈ 1 . . .m, the disturbance is considered over and the status is
changed back to normal. Finally, the detector outputs the current status in all cases.
Examples of using the disturbance detector for both frequency and voltage are shown in
Figure 4.5. Blue lines represent normal status and red lines represent disturbance status.
We can see that for both measurements, the disturbances can be detected quickly and
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Figure 4.4: Workflow of the disturbance detector
the normal status is retained soon after the disturbances end. Note that the status here
describes the entire system, therefore it is shared among all the measurements. So as long
as one measurement (f or vm) in one of the PMUs contains disturbances, all the five kinds
of measurements from all PMUs for this PDC are considered in disturbance status.
5
(a) Frequency (b) Voltage
Figure 4.5: Example of disturbance detection
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4.4.2 Compressor
The purpose of the compressor is to use a combination of PCA and DCT to compress the
input matrix in an intelligent way in order to reduce the data volume to send while keeping
the sampling window small and maintaining a certain accuracy for the reconstructed data. It
mainly uses two techniques to achieve that: the transformation matrix reuse in PCA and the
self-adapt PC number selection. The measurements of each kind are processed separately and
in parallel. Hence, there are actually five instances of the compressor running simultaneously,
each for one of the five kinds of measurements.
Figure 4.6: Workflow of the compressor
The workflow of the compressor is shown in Figure 4.6. Assume the input is an m × n
matrix X. The compressor first checks whether n is equal to the maximum window size K.
If n = K, it means the system is in normal status and the matrix is of standard size m×K.
The transformation matrix reuse module is then called. If n < K, it means the system is
in disturbance status and the self-adapt PC number selection module is called. These two
modules are explained as follows:
• Transformation Matrix Reuse: The intuition behind this module is that temporally
closed standard matrices could share very similar PCs, namely transformation matrix
P. We use Ppre to represent the latest transformation matrix calculated and sent to
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the receiving side in previous iterations4. Whenever a new data block is ready to be
compressed, instead of recalculating and resending each time a new transformation
matrix, Ppre is tested for reuse. To be more specific, the module compresses X using
Ppre followed by DCT. Then it reconstructs X˜ by inverse DCT and inverse PCA based
on Ppre. The reconstruction accuracy is evaluated by the maximum relative error
defined as5:
∆(X, X˜) = max
i=1...m
j=1...n
|xij − x˜ij |
ξi
(4.5)
where ξi equals the current mean defined in 4.4.1 for f, vm, im and equals to 360 for
va and ia. If the maximum relative error is less or equal to the specified tolerance
represented as τ 6, Ppre can be reused and the compressor only outputs the compressed
data. Otherwise, Ppre cannot be reused and the self-adapt PC number selection module
is called.
• Self-adapt PC Number Selection:
While using PCA to perform dimensionality reduction, one needs to decide the number
of PCs to keep, represented as r. The trade-off here is that decreasing r will decrease the
size of the compressed data but increase the error of reconstructed data. The purpose
of the self-adapt PC number selection module is to select the proper r to minimize the
compressed data size while keeping the reconstructed error in a certain threshold τ .
Equation 4.3 and a variance threshold γ is used to select r. The module works in an
iterative way. The iteration starts after matrices D and P are calculated according to
equation 4.2 and γ is initialized as γ0. In each iteration, the smallest r that satisfies
Γ(r) ≥ γ is selected, where Γ(r) is defined in equation 4.3. The transformation matrix
is then selected as P = E(r)T . The compressed matrix Z is calculated by projecting
X by P followed by DCT. If size(P) + size(Z) < size(X), data size is reduced after
compression and the iterations continues. Otherwise, no size reduction is gained after
compression and the original matrix X is assigned to the result. After the size check,
X˜ is reconstructed by inverse DCT and inverse PCA. The maximum relative error is
calculated and compared with the tolerance. If ∆(X, X˜) ≤ τ , the current r satisfies
the required reconstruction accuracy and the compressed matrix Z and transformation
matrix P are assigned to the result. Otherwise, the variance threshold γ is increased
4
Ppre is only updated when a new P is calculated and actually sent.
5This is slightly different from the standard definition of maximum relative error
6τ has different values for different measurement kinds and τ should always be smaller than θ to prevent
reconstruction error from triggering disturbances.
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and a new iteration begins. Note that the P in result are recorded by Ppre only when
the compression succeeds and X is of standard size, namely n = K.
4.5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of ISAAC in terms of time, CR,
and accuracy. The experiments run on a dataset consisting of field synchrophasor data col-
lected from a microgrid at Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) [62]. The dataset contains 18
hours of data (including disturbances) collected from 11 PMUs running at 60 Hz from 6 PM,
1/28/2014 to noon, 1/29/2014. The dataset includes 11 sequences of frequency measure-
ments, 94 sequences of voltage synchrophasors, and 119 sequences of current synchrophasors.
The parameter values used in ISAAC are shown in Table 4.1. Note that τf < θf and
τvm < θvm, so that reconstruction error won’t trigger disturbances. With the maximum
sampling window size K = 107 and arrival rate of 60 samples/second, the sampling window
of 10 samples has a length of 167 ms. All the parameter values are not fixed and can be tuned
by users to satisfy their own needs. Of the two WAMS architecture scenarios mentioned in
4.3.1, we choose the WAN-WAN scenario for experiments since it is likely to have a longer
communication delay and serves as a worse case for validation. We assume all the 11 PMUs
are connected to one PDC via WAN and the PDC is connected with a control center via
WAN. According to [63], the communication delay between a PMU and a PDC connected
by WAN follows a bimodal distribution containing two normal distributions. We assume the
communication delays between each pair of PMU and PDC and between PDC and control
center are all i.i.d. random variables following the same bimodal distribution with p = 0.5,
µ1 = 10 ms, σ1 = 1 ms, µ2 = 16 ms, σ2 = 3 ms, where p is the mixing factor. The absolute
timeout value of the PDC is set to 25 ms.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
K 10 τf 0.025% τim 4%
θf 0.1% τvm 0.2% τia 0.5%
θvm 1% τva 0.5% γ0 0.5
Table 4.1: Default parameter values of ISAAC
The compression ratio is calculated by the raw data size divided by the compressed data
size. And the accuracy of reconstructed data is measured in terms of the maximum percent-
age error (MPE) and the normalized root-mean-square error (NRMSE). Assume the original
7A larger K will result in a higher compression ratio but also a higher delay. Here we choose K = 10 for
a trade-off.
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data matrix is X ∈ Rm×t and the reconstructed matrix is X˜ ∈ Rm×t. MPE and NRMSE
can be calculated as
MPE = max
i=1...m
j=1...t
|xij − x˜ij |
µi
× 100% (4.6)
NRMSE =
1
m
m∑
i=1
√∑t
j=1(xij − x˜ij)
2
t
/
µi , (4.7)
where µi =
∑t
j=1 xij/t for f , vm, im, and µi = 360 for va and ia.
There are two implementations of ISAAC, namely PCA-D/DCT and PCA-S/DCT. The
CR, MPE, NRMSE of each type of measurement for the two implementations are shown
in Table 4.2. It can be seen that good CRs can be achieved while maintaining satisfactory
reconstruction accuracy. The only exception is the current magnitude data, where it is hard
to compress without introducing relatively large MPE. This is due to the extremely noisy
current magnitude data we observe. In this case, it might not worth compressing current
magnitude data to avoid sacrificing data fidelity.
Measurement
PCA-D/DCT PCA-S/DCT
CR
MPE
NRMSE CR
MPE
NRMSE
(%) (%)
f 9.11 0.025 4.12E-5 5.21 0.025 3.01E-5
vm 20.36 0.202 3.36E-4 19.86 0.202 3.31E-4
va 20.58 0.500 1.20E-3 21.45 0.500 1.05E-3
im 2.72 6.937 5.02E-3 1.31 6.937 5.05E-3
ia 3.52 0.500 5.96E-4 1.47 0.500 6.87E-4
Table 4.2: CR, MPE, and NRMSE of two implementations
Figure 4.7 illustrates a comparison between original data (blue lines) and reconstructed
data (red lines) for two sample frequency and voltage measurement sequences, based on
the PCA-D/DCT implementation of ISAAC. As we can see from the figure, most noises
are discarded while critical changes and disturbances are preserved. We also evaluate the
performance of DCT alone on data compressed by PCA already. After compressing the data
by PCA-D, DCT can further reduce the data size by 34.2% for f and 14.2% for vm.
Based on the accuracy requirements of the WAMS applications, τ can be changed to
achieve different accuracy levels. With various τf , the CR, MPE, NRMSE of frequency
measurements based on the PCA-D/DCT implementation of ISAAC is shown in Table 4.38.
We can see that the CR and reconstruction error both decrease as τ decreases. Therefore,
8These results are based on one hour of data in the IIT dataset.
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(a) Frequency
(b) Voltage
Figure 4.7: Original and reconstructed data
usually the largest τ that satisfies the accuracy requirements should be selected to maximize
the CR.
τf CR
MPE
NRMSE
(%)
0.001 18.31 0.1 1.52E-4
0.0005 14.27 0.05 6.42E-5
0.00025 8.37 0.025 4.20E-5
0.0001 3.44 0.01 2.37E-5
0.00005 1.79 0.005 1.32E-5
Table 4.3: CR, MPE, and NRMSE of frequency with various τf
To demonstrate ISAAC’s ability to satisfy the real-time requirements of WAMS appli-
cations, we also evaluate and processing time of different components and the end-to-end
data delay for both normal and disturbance status. The end-to-end delay is a sum of the
communication delay between PMU and PDC, PDC processing delay, communication delay
between PDC and control center, and the data reconstruction time. We run ISAAC on a
Mac with an Intel Core i7 1.7GHz CPU and 8GB memory. The average processing time of
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the disturbance detector, compressor and data reconstruction (done at the control center) for
each period is shown in Table 4.4. It can be seen that the processing time is quite negligible
and should be even shorter on real PDCs which are much more powerful devices than our
Mac. The average and the maximum end-to-end delays of normal and disturbance status
are shown in Table 4.5. We can see that the end-to-end delays in disturbance status are
significantly smaller than delays in normal status, which is desirable by most of the WAMS
applications. And a maximum delay of 201 ms satisfies the delay requirements of real-time
WAMS applications [64, 65].
disturbance detector 0.12
compressor 4.75
reconstruction 0.46
Table 4.4: Avg. Processing Time (millisecond)
Status Avg Max
normal 107.1 201.4
disturbance 32.5 49.6
Table 4.5: End-to-End Data Delay
(millisecond)
4.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I present ISAAC, an intelligent synchrophasor data real-time compression
framework for WAMS to be deployed in Layer 2 PDCs. Based a combination of PCA
and DCT techniques, ISAAC is able to mitigate the burden on communication and storage
systems laid by the huge synchrophasor data volume while satisfying the requirements of
real-time WAMS applications. A disturbance detector is utilized to identify disturbance data
and satisfy its stricter delay and accuracy requirements. The use of two techniques named
transformation matrix reuse in PCA and self-adapt PC number selection enables ISAAC
to achieve good compression ratios while maintaining satisfying delay and accuracy for the
reconstructed data. The performance of ISAAC is validated by experiments based on real
synchrophasor data.
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CHAPTER 5: EDMAND: EDGE-BASED MULTI-LEVEL ANOMALY
DETECTION FOR SCADA NETWORKS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
As stated in 1.1, SCADA systems in Smart Grid are subject to a wide range of serious
threats in recent years and they could suffer from catastrophic consequences due to success-
ful attacks. Well-known malicious cybersecurity incidents in SCADA systems include the
Stuxnet worm attack [66] and the BlackEnergy malware [67]. These attacks exploited the
vulnerabilities of SCADA systems and the situation is expected to deteriorate further for
several reasons. First, the adoption of cutting-edge communication technologies contributes
to the increasing complexity and interconnection of SCADA systems, which potentially pro-
vides greater opportunity for attacks from malicious sources. Since corporate intranets can
be connected to the internet, SCADA systems connections with corporate intranets may
expose their communication weakness to threats of broader aspects. Second, devices in
SCADA systems are usually not built with cybersecurity in consideration and lack authen-
tication or encryption mechanisms. To make things worse, the enabling of remote access to
these devices via wireless technologies makes them easy to compromise. Third, most ICS
protocols lack authentication features and provide no protection for the network traffic. The
vulnerabilities of SCADA systems can be exploited from both outside by malicious attackers
and inside by disgruntled employees. Besides deliberate attacks, inadvertent events such as
natural disasters, device failures, and operator mistakes may also jeopardize SCADA systems
due to those vulnerabilities. Therefore, developing techniques to target those vulnerabilities
and provide security to SCADA systems is a pertinent topic of particular importance.
In general, two types of analysis are available to provide security for SCADA systems:
host-based and network-based. We focus on network-based analysis which monitors and
inspects network traffic due to its less intrusive nature. In [18], I propose a light-weighted
operation-level traffic analyzer named OLAF to provide preliminary analysis of SCADA.
That is not enough to guarantee situational awareness and a more thorough monitoring
and analysis and required. Based on different analysis granularity, data in SCADA network
traffic generally can be divided into three levels: transport level, operation level, and content
level. Transport level data refers to statistics in IP headers and transport protocol headers.
Operation level data refers to operation statistics in ICS protocols. Content level data refers
to measurement statistics from field devices. Among all network-based security analysis
approaches for SCADA systems, most existing solutions only focus on monitoring and event
detection of one or two levels of data, which is not enough to detect and reason about attacks
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in all three levels. Also, data in each level has its own characteristics, which requires distinct
methods to deal with. In this work, we develop an edge-based multi-level anomaly detection
framework for SCADA networks, named EDMAND. EDMAND is located inside the remote
substations, which are the edges of the SCADA network. It contains a multi-level anomaly
detector to monitor all three levels of network traffic data passing by. Appropriate anomaly
detection methods are applied based on the distinct characteristics of data in various levels
and alerts are generated, aggregated, prioritized, and sent back to control centers when
anomalies are detected.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We divide traffic data into multiple levels and apply appropriate anomaly detection
mechanism to data in each level based on their characteristics.
• We introduce the concept of confidence into the anomaly detection process and assign
confidence scores to generated alerts.
• We aggregate and prioritize alerts to benefit further analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the related work.
Section 5.3 introduces the network architecture of SCADA systems and two of our design
decisions. Section 5.4 gives an overview of the design of EDMAND. Section 5.6 shows the
performance evaluation of EDMAND and Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 RELATED WORK
As we mentioned in the previous section, SCADA network traffic data can be categorized
into three levels but most existing network-based intrusion detection only take one or two
levels into consideration. [68, 69] focus on flow-level data while [70, 71, 72, 73, 74] analyze
ICS protocol functions. [75, 76] only concentrate on content-level and [77, 78] cover the flow
and operation levels. None of these approaches analyze all three levels of data and therefore
may fail to detect anomalies in levels not covered. Moreover, a sophisticated multi-step
attack may introduce anomalies in multiple levels of traffic data. The whole picture of the
attack can be seen only when all three levels of anomalies are detected.
[79] touches three levels of network traffic data by proposing an intrusion detection sys-
tem implementing intelligent packet inspection mechanism, tailored traffic flow analysis, and
unique packet tampering detection. However, the authors only use signature-based detec-
tion to detect malformed packets in the operation level and fail to take advantage of the
periodicity of operations. In the content level, it only checks consistency of data at multiple
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locations of the system but leaves the statistics of out. As a result, this approach can only
deal with data tampering attacks in communication but fails to detect attacks such as fake
data due to compromised devices.
The most similar work to ours is [80]. The authors develop a multiattribute SCADA-
specific intrusion detection system. The system uses white lists and behavior-based rules to
analyze multiple attributes in transport, operation, and content levels to mitigate various
cyberattacks. However, without any method to filter and prioritize alerts, the operator can
easily be overwhelmed by false positives or low-priority alerts and miss the high-priority
ones. Also, in our framework, alerts in on one level will affect the alert triggering in the
other two levels, which is helpful in reducing false alerts.
5.3 NETWORK ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN DECISION
In this section, we introduce the SCADA network architecture. Then we explain two
important design decisions we made for the framework.
5.3.1 Network Architecture
A simplified architecture of SCADA network is shown in Figure 5.1. The major compo-
nents in SCADA network include the Master Terminal Units (MTUs) in the control centers,
field controllers in the substations and the communication network that connects them. The
field controllers can be Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) or Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs), which further connect to and receive measurements from field devices such as sensors
or actuators. The MTU in the control center queries the field controllers for system updates
and may also issue control commands to them to change the control strategy. To avoid
further data collection time and achieve prompt anomaly detection, we deploy EDMAND
at the edge of the SCADA network. To be more specific, EDMAND is deployed in each
substation between the field controllers and the wide area network. EDMAND monitors all
traffic passing by and sends alerts back to control centers when anomalies are detected.
Figure 5.1: SCADA network architecture
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5.3.2 Design Decision
We made two important decisions while designing our framework. The first one is to
divide traffic data into multiple levels and apply appropriate anomaly detection mechanisms
to data in each level based on their characteristics. As we mentioned previously, data in
SCADA traffic can be divided into three levels: transport level, operation level, and content
level. Data in each level have their own characteristics, which is taken into consideration
when we select anomaly detection mechanisms for each level.
The second design decision is to introduce the concept of confidence into the anomaly
detection process and assign confidence scores to generated alerts. We define an alert’s
confidence score CS ∈ [0, 1] to be the confidence that the alert is indeed an anomaly.
We calculate the confidence score by CS = MA × AS, where MA is the model accuracy
and AS is the anomaly score. The model accuracy measures the accuracy of our anomaly
detection model in describing normal behavior and serves as the weight of the anomaly
score. We assume that the majority of traffic data is normal data and therefore we can
build models with higher accuracy as more samples are observed. In this sense, we estimate
the model accuracy by a modified sigmoid function of observed sample number as MA =
2/(1 + e−n/N ) − 1, where n is the observed sample number by the model and N = 100 is
a normalization factor. The anomaly score measures how far the current sample deviates
from the normal behavior described by the model. Different methods are used to calculate
the anomaly score for different data and they are introduced in the next section.
5.4 FRAMEWORK DESIGN
In this section, we present an overview of the modular design of EDMAND. As it is shown
in Figure 5.2, EDMAND consists of 3 main components: (1)Data Extractor, (2)Anomaly
Detector, (3)Alert Manager. The data extractor is implemented utilizing a network security
monitor called Bro [39]. The data extractor monitors the network traffic passing by and
forwards all three levels of network traffic data to the anomaly detector. The anomaly
detector contains three levels and each level uses appropriate method to detect anomalies
and generates alerts. After that, the alert manager aggregates similar alerts into meta-alerts.
Priorities are given to meta-alerts and the alert manager reports meta-alerts to the control
center with various frequencies according to their priorities. The anomaly detector and the
alert manager will be described in more detail in the following two subsections.
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Figure 5.2: EDMAND architecture
5.4.1 Anomaly Detector
The structure of the multi-level anomaly detector is shown in Figure 5.3. There is a listener
which receives Bro data from the data extractor and feeds them to the three modules for
three levels. In each module, there is a parser that parses the Bro data corresponding to
that level and translates them to standard input data for the processor. The processors
implement various anomaly detection mechanisms to detect anomalies and generate alerts.
We will introduce the three modules for three levels of data respectively.
Figure 5.3: Multi-level anomaly detector structure
Transport-Level Module
In the transport-level module, two kinds of analysis at different time scales are applied. A
packet processor analyzes each packet for short-term analysis. A flow aggregator aggregates
packet statistics every period Tflow = 10min and forwards to a flow processor for long-term
analysis.
The input data to both processors consists of two kinds of fields: the index field which
describes the packet or flow related with the input data, and data fields which store statistics
for anomaly detection. As it is listed in Table 5.1, the index fields for both processors share
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the same structure, which is a 4-tuple including originator(IP), responder(IP), transport
protocol, and port number. The packet processor has interarrival time IAT and packet size
PS as its data fields and the flow processor has packet count PC and average packet size
APS as its data fields. Each type of data field has two values, corresponding to statistics of
traffic in both directions.
Packet Processor Flow Processor
Index Field (originator, responder, transport protocol, port number)
Data Field
interarrival time (IAT ) packet count (PC)
packet size (PS) average packet size (APS)
Mechanism 1D-DenStream Mean-STD
Table 5.1: Input fields and anomaly detection mechanism of packet processor and flow
processor
There are two types of anomalies for these two processors. The first type happens when
input data with new index field are seen and the anomaly score is set to 1 in this scenario.
The second type is abnormal value in data fields and we use various anomaly detection
mechanisms to detect anomalies of this type. We mentioned previously that one of the design
decision we made is to apply appropriate method to data with different characteristics. Since
packet statistics and flow statistics follow quite different distributions, different anomaly
detection mechanisms are utilized for the packet processor and flow processor. On the one
hand, since traffic in SCADA usually follows periodic patterns [81, 82, 83, 84], the packet
count PC and average packet size APS in a certain period usually follows a unimodal
distribution as long as the period is selected properly. Therefore, the mean and standard
deviation are good enough to characterize these data fields. We build models for these data
fields by calculating the exponentially-weighted mean and standard deviation. The anomaly
score AS is calculated as the square of the anomaly score we used in [18] as
AS(X, µ, σ) =

(
1− σ
2
|X−µ|2
)2
if |X − µ| > σ
0 otherwise
, (5.1)
where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation stored in the model and X is the data
field value of the current input (i.e., PC or APS for the flow processor). For convenience,
we call this anomaly detection mechanism Mean-STD in the rest of this chapter. On the
other hand, the interarrival time IAT and the packet size PS of each packet usually follow
multimodal distributions. Consider the following scenario, the control center is sending
periodic read requests to a field controller. Each request is followed by a response from
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the field controller and then a confirmation from the control center. For packets from
the control center to the field controller, read requests and confirmations could have big
difference in packet size PS but both are considered as normal packets. For this reason,
the mean and standard deviation may not be able to characterize these data fields and we
utilize a clustering method instead. We use a modified 1D version of the DenStream in [85].
DenStream is an approach to cluster data in an evolving data stream and data is clustered
into potential core-micro-clusters and outlier micro-clusters. An alert is generated whenever
the new value point is added to an outlier micro-cluster and the anomaly score is calculated
as AS(w, µ, β) = 1 − (w − 1)/(βµ− 1), where µ and β are predefined parameters and w is
the weight of the outlier micro-cluster.
Operation-Level Module
The objective of the operation-level module of the anomaly detector is to detect anomalies
in operations (e.g., requests and responses) of ICS protocols such as Modbus and DNP3.
Similarly, the input data of the operation processor have an index field and a data field. We
use a 5-tuple of (originator(IP), responder(IP), ICS protocol, unit id, function code) as the
index field and interarrival time IAT as the data field. Here unit id is a ICS protocol specific
address which is used to differential devices that share the same IP address. Notice that the
IAT in operation level is different from the IAT in transport level. In operation level, the
IAT is the difference in timestamps of two consecutive same operations between one pair of
nodes (i.e., the two operations share the same index field). In transport level, the IAT is
the difference in timestamps of two consecutive packets of the same direction between one
pair of nodes which could be different operations or even non-ICS-protocol packets.
As it is shown in Table 5.2, there are mainly three types of anomalies in this level. The
first type includes invalid function code and wrong direction of operation. In normal status,
requests should only be sent by the control center and received by field controllers and
responses should be sent by field controllers and received by the control center. Wrong
direction here stands for unexpected scenarios such as requests initiated by field controllers
or responses sent by the control center. For an anomaly of the first type, an alert is generated
directly and a confidence scores of 1 is assigned. The second type of anomaly is the emerging
of new operation, which is identified when input with new field index is observed. In this case,
an anomaly score of 1 is given. The third type of anomalies includes scenarios of periodic
operation arriving too early, arriving too late, or disappearing1. In SCADA, the IAT of
1The disappearing of traffic or operation is sometimes called a passive anomaly and we use a timer to
detect it in both transport level and operation level.
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the same operation follows a unimodal distribution since operations are usually periodic.
Therefore, the Mean-STD mechanism is used for anomaly detection and AS is calculated by
equation 5.1 where X is replaced by IAT in operation level.
Anomaly Mechanism
invalid function code
CS=1
wrong direction of operation
new operation AS=1
early operation
Mean-STDlate operation
missing operation
Table 5.2: Anomaly and detection mechanism in operation level
Content-Level Module
The content-level module of the anomaly detector is responsible for detecting anomalies in
measurement values such as frequencies and voltages which are included in responses to read
requests. The input data of the content processor have a 5-tuple of (measure source (IP),
ICS protocol, unit id, measurement type, measurement index) as the index field and the
measurement value itself as the data field. Depending on the measurement type, different
methods are applied for anomaly detection. Let us take DNP3 for example, where the three
measurement types are Binary, Analog, and Counter. Here we will discuss the first two
which are most commonly seen.
For the Binary measurement type, the intuition behind the detection method is that a
binary variable can only take two values (i.e., 0 or 1) and always one of them is normal
and the other is abnormal. Therefore, we can try to identify the normal value by simply
counting the 0s and 1s in observed samples. The normal value is 0 if the majority of the
observed values are 0s and vice versa. Whenever the abnormal value appears, we calculate
the anomaly score by one minus the entropy of observed samples as
AS(γ) =
1 + γ log2 γ + (1− γ) log2(1− γ) if 0 < γ < 11 if γ = 0 or 1
where γ =
number of 0s observed
number of samples observed
.
For the analog measurement type, we take the Smart Grid as an example. Frequency,
voltage, current, and power are four most common classes of analog measurements and they
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usually have quite different characteristics. The two subfigures in Figure 5.4 show one day
of simulated frequency and current measurements from the Information Trust Institute’s
testbed [86]. We can see that ‘frequency’ is always around 60Hz and has a very small
relative standard deviation whereas ‘current’ varies a lot but follows a diurnal pattern.
Based on different analog classes’ characteristics, we develop a 2-step anomaly detection
method to analog measurements. In step 1, we further categorize analog measurements
into different analog classes (i.e., frequency, voltage, current, power) and use an appropriate
method for each class to detect anomalies in step 2. Notice that if the configuration files
of field controllers are available and the specification of each analog index is known to our
framework, step 1 can be neglected. Step 1 just provides analog class inference ability to
our framework when specification is not given.
(a) Frequency (b) Current
Figure 5.4: One day’s simulated measurement data of frequency and current
More specifically, in step 1 of our analog measurement anomaly detection, we utilize a
similar Bayesian inference method as in [87] and build an analog class inference model based
on the Bayesian network. Here we use a very simple Bayesian network with one root node
and three leaf nodes shown in Figure 5.5. Each leaf node has a conditional probability table
(CPT) representing the prior knowledge of the dependence between the child node and its
parent node whose elements are defined by CPTij = P (child state = j|parent state = i).
The root represents the analog class with four hypothesis states and the leaf nodes represent
directly observable evidences and each leaf node has several discrete states. The objective
of this model is to calculate the belief in hypotheses of the root, which is decided by the
likelihood propagated from its child nodes and ultimately the observed evidences at the leaf
nodes. We denote yk (k ∈ 1 . . . 3) as the observation at kth leaf node and xi (i ∈ 1 . . . 4) as
the ith analog class at the root node. Let P (xi) be the prior probability for the hypotheses of
the root. The prior probability and CPTs can either be acquired based on domain knowledge
or calculated based on training data. The believe in the analog class xi is represented by the
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conditional probability of xi given the observation at all leaf nodes and can be calculated by
P
(
xi|y
1, y2, y3
)
= αP (xi)
3∏
k=1
P
(
yk|xi
)
,
where α = 1/P (y1, y2, y3) and can be calculated by
∑
i P (xi|y
1, y2, y3) = 1. If the believe
of xi is larger than a threshold θb = 0.7 , the inference model infers the analog measurement
as class xi. Since the analog class for the same series of measurements will not change in
normal status, the inference model stops analyzing for that series of measurements after its
class is successfully inferred.
Figure 5.5: Analog class inference model
After the analog classes are inferred, different anomaly detection methods are applied as
shown in Table 5.3. Mean and standard deviation are used for frequency and voltage. For
current or power, we divide 24 hours to multiple time slots and calculate mean and stan-
dard deviation in each of the slot throughout multiple days. For analog measurements not
belonging to any of the mentioned classes, the 1D-DenStream method for the flow processor
is utilized. Notice that this list of analog classes can be extended by incorporating prior
knowledge of other analog classes into the inference model and taking their characteristics
into consideration while selecting their anomaly detection methods.
Analog Class Mechanism
frequency
Mean-STD
voltage
current/power slotted Mean-STD
unknown 1D-DenStream
Table 5.3: Analog measurement class and detection mechanism
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5.4.2 Alert Manager
The alerts generated by EDMAND’s multi-level anomaly detector which have confidence
score higher than a threshold θCS are forwarded into the alert manager. We use a dynamic
mechanism for θCS. The initial threshold is set at a upper bound value of θCS H = 0.95.
For every alert with CS above the current threshold, we calculate the new threshold as
θCS new = e
−λ(θCS cur − θCS L) + θCS L where θCS L = 0.85 is a lower bound and λ = 0.05
is a parameter can be tuned. While we exponentially decrease the threshold to approach
the lower bound for triggered alerts, we also linearly increases the threshold to the upper
bound as time goes by. Keeping an high threshold in normal state helps to decrease false
alarms and decreasing the threshold when alarms are triggered helps to detect all anomalies
related to the attack and is useful against multi-step attacks. Since the alert from the three
levels share the same threshold, alerts in one level will lower the threshold, making it easier
to detect simultaneous anomalies in the other two levels if there are any.
Alerts generated by different processors share the following common fields: index field,
alert type, timestamp, confidence score, statistical fields and abnormal data. Index field is
the same as the index field in the input data of the corresponding processor. Alert type is
the description of the anomaly. Statistical fields include statistics in the data field such as
current data value, mean, standard deviation, etc. Abnormal data is the original input data
of the processor which triggering the alert. As it is shown in Figure 5.6, the alert manager
consists of two components: the Alert Aggregator and the Alert Scheduler.
Figure 5.6: Alert manager structure
The objective of the alert aggregator is to aggregate alerts that share the same alert type
as well as the index field and have little difference in timestamps. The aggregated alert is
called the meta-alert. The meta-alert inherits all the fields from the alerts before aggregation
with each field type having its own aggregation rule listed in Table 5.4. Another count field
is added to store the number of alerts aggregated to this meta-alert. Whenever the alert
aggregator receives a new alert, it tries to aggregate it to existing meta-alerts. If there is no
meta-alert that this alert can merge to, a new meta-alert is created. In this way, consecutive
duplicate alerts about the same event are aggregated to one meta-alert, which prevents alert
flooding and simplifies further analysis of the alerts.
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Alert Field Aggregation Rule
index field
shared by all of the aggregated alerts
alert type
timestamp keep minimum and maximum
confidence score keep maximum
statistical fields
inherit from the last alert aggregated
anomaly data
count number of aggregated alerts
Table 5.4: Meta-alert fields and aggregation rules
Every time a meta-alert is created or updated, it is forwarded to the alert scheduler, where
its priority score is calculated and its report frequency is decided. The alert priority com-
putation model in Figure 5.7 is similar to the analog class inference model. It is a Bayesian
network with one root node and five leaf nodes. The root represents the alert priority which
has two hypothesis states of low and high. Similarly, the leaf nodes represent observable ev-
idence and each has several discrete states. We denote yk (k ∈ 1 . . . 5) as the observation at
kth leaf node. We define the priority score PS as PS = P (Priority = high|y1, y2, y3, y4, y5)
which can be calculated in a similar way as the analog class inference model. The prior
probability of priority, CPTs at leaf nodes, and criteria to categorize observation are set by
domain knowledge or system requirements. For example, the critical operation set for DNP3
can be defined by the DNP3 critical request function codes in [88] or entered by utilities
according to their own needs.
Figure 5.7: Alert priority computation model
Different report mechanisms in Table 5.5 are applied to meta-alerts based on their priority
scores PS. After PS is calculated, the meta-alert is classified as high-priority or low-priority,
based on PS and a threshold θp = 0.7 as shown in Table 5.5. High-priority meta-alerts are
always reported immediately when first created and reported with a small period if they are
updated during that period. Low-priority meta-alerts are not reported immediately upon
creation and reported with a large period if they are updated during the period. In the
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future, we plan to design a causality-based anomaly analyzer in the control center to further
correlate and analyze the received alerts.
High-Priority Low-Priority
Definition PS ≥ θp PS < θp
Report when first created yes no
Report period Th Tl(> Th)
Table 5.5: Meta-alert report mechanism
5.5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we want to briefly discuss the scalability and extensibility of EDMAND.
There are multiple substations in SCADA networks and each substation contains an ED-
MAND by default. So adding more substations will not cause any scalability issue of ED-
MAND. Increasing the number of end devices in each substation does increase the complexity
of the network traffic, and further increases the anomaly detection complexity of EDMAND.
However, the number of end devices in each substations is usually quite limited. For exam-
ple, Modbus’s unit id has a range of 0-247, which limits the number of end devices of each
substation. Even if the number of end devices at each substation is too many for EDMAND
to handle in real time, there is nothing to prevent us from deploying multiple EDMANDs in
each substation. Moreover, the packet analysis of EDMAND happens in parallel with the
packet passing and does not block the packets. Therefore, the original communication in
SCADA will not be affected by EDMAND.
The current prototype of EDMAND supports Modbus and DNP3 for SCADA networks.
To add support for other industrial control protocols, only the data extractor needs to be
extended. As long as the data extractor is equipped with the capabilities of parsing desired
protocols and the outputs follow a consistent format, the other components need not to be
changed to support those protocols.
5.6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of EDMAND in two aspects: detection ability
and time overhead. The data extractor is implemented by Bro and the anomaly detector
as well as the alert manager are implemented in Python. The evaluation is based on a
simulated DNP3 traffic set which includes periodic baseline traffic and injected anomalies in
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transport, operation, and content levels. The baseline traffic consists of 10 days of simulated
traffic of one control center sending read requests to two field controllers every 20 seconds.
Each read request is followed by a TCP acknowledgement as well as a response from the
field controller. After the response, which contains the requested measurements, is received
by the control center, the control center sends a confirmation which is again followed by
an acknowledgement from the field controller. The baseline traffic is generated based on
DNP3 specification [25], domain experts’ advices, and some example DNP3 traffic we have
generated by a testbed from Information Trust Institute at Illinois. Each field controller
contains 5 measurements: one binary measurement and four analog measurements including
frequency, voltage, current and power. Those measurements are also simulated data from
the testbed.
The analog class inference model correctly identifies all analog classes in the baseline traffic.
We inject various anomalies in the three levels listed in Table 5.6 to evaluate EDMAND’s
anomaly detection ability. EDMAND is able to detect all the anomalies injected with no
false alarms. This 0% false alarm rate has two reasons. The first one is that EDMAND
already filters out low-quality alerts by discarding alerts with low confidence scores. And
the second reason is that the simulated traffic is not as noisy as real-world SCADA traffic.
We consider to use real traffic with real attacks to evaluate EDMAND if we can get access
to real data in the future. All the injected anomalies generate 12135 alerts in total, and are
aggregated to 22 meta-alerts. We list in Table 5.6 some related works’ detection abilities
based on their description for anomalies which we injected. None of them are able to detect
all anomalies like EDMAND does.
We also create a simple multi-step attack scenario with simulated traffic. In step 1, the
attacker scans several ports in a given IP address range to find the target field device and
the ICS protocol which the SCADA system is using. In step 2, the attacker sends a write
request to the field device to compromise the device. In step 3, the compromised device
sends tampered data in responses to read requests from the control center. EDMAND is
able to detect all three steps of the attack where the three steps are detected in transport
level, operation level, and content levels, respectively. A framework, concentrating on one
or two levels of data analysis only, may not be able to see the whole picture of the attack.
One of our design decisions is to apply appropriate anomaly detection mechanisms to
data, based on their characteristics. We use the 1D-DenStream mechanism for the packet
processor since its data fields (i.e., interarrival time and packet size) follow multimodal
distributions. To validate this design decision, we use the Mean-STD mechanism instead
for the packet processor. We find that the modified packet processor is unable to detect
the padded response and the delayed TCP acknowledgement, and generates tons of false
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Level Anomaly
Detection Ability
ED [68] [73] [75] [77] [80]
T
ra
n
sp
or
t
add a new node to send several
packets to one field controller
Y Y N N Y Y
pad one response from a field
controller with more payload
Y Y N N Y Y
delay one TCP acknowledgement from
a field controller intentionally
Y Y N N N N
send lots of ICMP packets in a short
period to one field controller
Y Y N N Y Y
O
p
er
at
io
n
send one operation with invalid
function code to one field controller
Y N Y M Y Y
let one field controller send a control
command to the control center
Y N Y M Y Y
delay one response from a
field controller intentionally
Y M N N N Y
C
on
te
n
t
tamper with the binary value from one
field controller for a short period
Y N N Y N Y
introduce over voltage and under voltage
tripping to voltage measurements
Y N N Y N Y
introduce over current tripping to
current measurements
Y N N M N M
tamper with the frequency value from one
field controller for a short period
Y N N Y N Y
tamper with the power value from one
field controller for a short period
Y N N M N M
Table 5.6: Injected anomalies and detection ability comparison (ED=EDMAND, Y=yes,
N=no, M=maybe)
alarms. This proves that selecting appropriate anomaly detection mechanism according to
data characteristics is important. We also validate the alert priority computation model by
calculating priority scores of meta-alerts triggered by two anomalies. The first anomaly is
that the control center suddenly starts to send periodic write request (critical operation) to
the field controller, which is considered a critical node. The second anomaly is the delay of
one TCP acknowledgement from a field controller which is not a critical node. The meta-
alert for the first anomaly has a priority score of 0.995, which is higher than the score of
0.439 for the second anomaly. This is consistent with the fact that the first anomaly is more
critical than the second one.
To demonstrate EDMAND’s ability to satisfy the real-time requirements of anomaly de-
tection in SCADA systems, we also evaluate the time overhead of data analysis in the three
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levels and the alert manager. We run our experiments on the Ubuntu 16.04 desktop with 12
Intel Xeon 3.60GHz CPUs and 16GB memory. The data extraction in Bro and the anomaly
detection for the three levels run in parallel. The total analysis time (data extraction time +
anomaly detection time) per packet is 3.87ms for transport level, 6.66ms for operation level,
and 1.94ms for content level. These time overheads are comparable with previous works
[33, 69] which also have a time overhead in the order of a few milliseconds per packet. Also,
since the common data collection interval in SCADA systems is seconds or even minutes
[89], several milliseconds overhead per packet is short enough for the packets to be processed
at communication line speed. The average time overhead of the anomaly manager for each
alert is 423ms. The rate of alerts varies a lot for different attacks. Usually, the rate of alerts
is far smaller than the rate of packets. For example, in [69], the man-in-the-middle attack
generates 4195 alerts per hour per RTU. EDMAND is able to handle all the alerts in real
time in this case. If there is a burst of alerts for some specific attacks, then most of the
alerts could be duplicates that contain redundant information. Therefore, dropping some of
them will not affect the further analysis of the alerts and can help EDMAND to process the
rest of the alerts in real time.
5.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I present EDMAND, an edge-based multi-level anomaly detection frame-
work for SCADA systems. EDMAND resides in remote substations of SCADA systems and
monitors network traffic of flow level, operation level, and content level. Distinct data char-
acteristics are considered when selecting anomaly detection method for each level. When
anomalies are detected, EDMAND generates, aggregates, and prioritizes alerts and sends
them to control centers. The performance of EDMAND is validated by experiments.
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CHAPTER 6: CAPTAR: CAUSAL-POLYTREE-BASED ANOMALY
REASONING FOR SCADA NETWORKS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, large-scale distributed critical infrastructure systems such as power grids and
refineries increasingly rely on digital industrial control systems (ICSs) for real-time monitor-
ing, data collection, and control. The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
system is the most commonly used ICS. Critical as they are, SCADA systems are subject
to a wide range of serious threats for reasons mentioned in Section 5.1. Therefore, securing
SCADA systems against various threats and vulnerabilities has become a major challenge.
To promote the security of SCADA systems, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are in-
creasingly deployed by SCADA operators. As the name suggests, the main objective of
IDSs is to monitor the system, detect suspicious activities caused by intrusion attempts,
and report alerts to the system operators. Although IDSs play an undeniable role in the
protection of SCADA systems, they still suffer from some defects. The biggest issue with
traditional IDSs is that they continuously generate tremendous number of alerts without
further comprehending them. Drowned in an ocean of unstructured alerts mixed with false
positives, SCADA operators are almost blind to see any useful information. Due to the high
volume and low quality of the alerts, it becomes a nearly impossible task for the operators
to figure out the complete pictures of the attacks and take appropriate actions in a timely
manner.
To address the aforementioned problem of traditional IDSs and provide the SCADA op-
erators with explainable situational awareness, there is a need for an efficient system to
aggregate redundant alerts from IDSs, correlate them in an intelligent manner, and discover
attack strategies based on domain knowledge as well as causal reasoning. In Chapter 5,
we described our edge-based multi-level anomaly detection framework for SCADA, named
EDMAND. EDMAND resides at the edges of the SCADA network and detects anomalies in
multiple levels of the network. The triggered alerts are aggregated, prioritized, and sent to
the control center. In this chapter, we present a causal-polytree-based anomaly reasoning
framework for SCADA networks, named CAPTAR. CAPTAR resides in the control center
of the SCADA network and takes the meta-alerts from EDMAND as input (shown in Figure
6.1). CAPTAR correlates the alerts using a naive Bayes classifier and matches them to
predefined causal polytrees. Utilizing Bayesian inference on the causal polytrees, CAPTAR
is able to reveal the attack scenarios from the alerts and produces a high-level view of the
security state of the protected SCADA network.
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Figure 6.1: Locations of EDMAND and CAPTAR
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 reviews the related
work. Section 6.3 introduces the basic concept of Bayesian network, Bayesian inference, and
belief propagation. These concepts are utilized in the anomaly reasoning in this chapter.
Two canonical models which are used to build our causal polytrees are also introduced in
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 gives an overview of the design of CAPTAR. Section 6.5 shows
the performance evaluation of CAPTAR and Section 6.6 concludes the chapter. Since this
Chapter uses many difference notations, some of the most important notations are listed in
Table 6.1 for quick reference.
6.2 RELATED WORK
Various techniques have been used to measure the similarity of common features of alerts
to correlate them [90, 91, 92, 93]. However, alert correlation alone can only measure the
correlation strength between alerts and are not sufficient to recognize the whole picture of
the attack.
To fill the gap of alert correlation, many works have been proposed in the area of attack
plan recognition. Some works [94, 95] keep the state of the system and assume that the state
evolves towards a “worse” direction during attacks. There are also works [96, 97] that define
prerequisites and consequences of each attack step and construct chains or graphs based
on the matching of prerequisites and consequences. Bayesian networks are also utilized by
many papers [98, 96, 99, 100, 101] to correlate alerts or to represent and infer the causal
relationship between attack steps.
The closest previous work [87] to ours is the integration of alert aggregation, prioritization,
correlation, and attack plan recognition. Three alert correlation methods are proposed:
probabilistic-based, causal discovery-based, and temporal based methods. The attack plan
recognition step also uses causal polytrees to represent attack plans.
CAPTAR mainly differentiates from all previous works in two aspects. First, the alerts re-
ceived by CAPTAR are meta-alerts generated by EDMAND, which is our edge-based multi-
level anomaly detection framework for SCADA. EDMAND applies network-based rather
than host-based detection and it mainly takes the anomaly-based approach instead of the
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Notation Description
X A node in the Bayesian network representing a random variable.
U A parent of X in the Bayesian network.
Y A child of X in the Bayesian network.
e
+
X Evidence contained in the sub-tree rooted at X .
e
−
X Evidence contained in the rest of the Bayesian network other than e
+
X .
πX(u) Causal support provided by parent U to X .
λY (x) Diagnostic support provided by child Y to X .
BEL(x) Belief at node X .
X˜ Auxiliary child node of X to simulate evidence of matched meta-alerts.
λX˜(x) Diagnostic support provided by X˜ to X .
I Inhibitory mechanism in “noisy-OR” model.
E Enabling mechanism in “noisy-AND” model.
q Probability that the inhibitory or enabling mechanism is active.
CS(a) Confidence score of meta-alert a.
AT Attack template.
ATS Attack template set.
SAT Set of consequence nodes of attack template AT .
AU Alert unit.
w Weight in the alert unit.
A Alert type in the alert unit.
CStotal Total confidence score of all matched meta-alerts of a node.
BELmax(AT ) Maximum probability of existence of all consequence nodes in AT .
Cormax Maximum correlation score of a meta-alert in an attack template.
ATSmatch Attack template set containing alert matching results.
Xcor Exact match node with the highest correlation score for a meta-alert.
Xpot Set of potential nodes a meta-alert could match to.
K Maximum number of attack templates to keep for each kind of attack.
M Number of meta-alerts in the meta-alert database.
N Maximum number of nodes in any attack template.
L Number of attack templates in the attack template database.
Table 6.1: Table of notation for Chapter 6
signature-based approach. The alerts from EDMAND do not directly relate to each attack
step in the attack plan but instead relate to various network behaviors triggered by each
attack step. Therefore, mapping between alerts from EDMAND and underlying attack steps
is necessary for our anomaly reasoning. Second, we define the concept of confidence score
for each alert in EDMAND. In CAPTAR, the confidence scores of meta-alerts are utilized
to calculate the diagnostic support for each node in the causal polytrees during the belief
propagation. This allows each alert to carry more belief information instead of only a binary
state (exist/not exist).
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6.3 PRELIMINARIES
An example workflow of EDMAND and CAPTAR is shown in Figure 6.2. After an
attacker launches an attack, each step of the attack could result in one or more anomalies
in the network traffic. These anomalies trigger meta-alerts in EDMAND. CAPTAR receives
the meta-alerts from EDMAND and tries to infer the attack steps that triggered them by
mapping meta-alerts to attack steps. Potential attack steps are structured as nodes in
causal polytrees whose nature are Bayesian networks. Bayesian inference is performed on
those causal polytrees to reason about the existence of attacks. In this section, we first
introduce the basic concept of Bayesian network. Then we describe inference in Bayesian
network followed by the belief propagation algorithm to conduct Bayesian inference. Finally,
we present two canonical models we use to build our causal trees: “noisy-OR” and“noisy-
AND” models.
Figure 6.2: An example workflow of EDMAND and CAPTAR
6.3.1 Bayesian Network
Before going into exactly what a Bayesian network is, it is first useful to review two
concepts in probability theory. The first concept is the chain rule of probability. It says that
if we have a set of n random variables, X1, X2, . . . , Xn, then the joint probability distribution
P (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) can be written as a product of n conditional probabilities:
P (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) = P (Xn|Xn−1, . . . , X2, X1) · · ·P (X2|X1)P (X1). (6.1)
The second concept is the conditional independence. We say that two random variables,
A and B, are conditionally independent given another random variable C if P (A|B,C) =
P (A|C). In other words, once we know C, learning B would not change our belief in A.
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After recalling the chain rule of probability and the conditional independence, we can
introduce the basics of Bayesian network. A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) in which the nodes represent variables, the edges signify the existence of direct
causal influences between the linked variables, and the strengths of these influences are
expressed by conditional probabilities. Figure 6.3 illustrates a simple yet typical Bayesian
network. It describes relationships among the seasons of the year (X1), whether rain falls
(X2), whether the sprinkler is on (X3), whether the pavement would get wet (X4), and
whether the pavement would be slippery (X5). All variables in this figure are binary (taking
a value of either true or false) except for the root variable X1, which can take one of four
values: spring, summer, fall, or winter.
Figure 6.3: Bayesian network example
Each edge in the figure represents a direct causal influence from the head of the edge to the
tail. In Figure 6.3, X4 has a directed edge pointing to X5. This is because the fact that the
pavement is wet has a direct causal influence on whether the pavement is slippery. On the
contrary, the absence of a direct edge between two nodes implies conditional independence.
For example, the absence of a direct edge between X1 and X5 captures the understanding
that the influence of seasonal variations on the slipperiness of the pavement is mediated by
other conditions (e.g., the wetness of the pavement).
Each node in the Bayesian network is associated with a probability function that takes
(as input) a particular set of values for the node’s parent variables, and gives (as output)
the probability of the variable represented by the node. The most common form of this
probability function is a conditional probability table (CPT). CPT is a table defined for a
set of discrete and mutually dependent random variables to display conditional probabilities
of a single variable with respect to the others. An example CPT of X4 in Figure 6.3 is shown
in Table 6.2. It gives the conditional probabilities of P (X4|X2, X3).
An important property of Bayesian networks is the local (parental) Markov condition,
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X2 X3 X4 = T X4 = F
F F 0.0 1.0
F T 0.8 0.2
T F 0.9 0.1
T T 0.99 0.01
Table 6.2: Conditional probability table of X4
which states that every node in a Bayesian network is conditionally independent of all its
non-descendants given its parent. In the above example, we have P (X5|X1, X2, X3, X4) =
P (X5|X4) since Slippery is conditionally independent of its non-descendants, Season, Sprin-
kler, and Rain, given its parent Wet. This property allows us to simplify the joint distribu-
tion, obtained using the chain rule, to a simpler form. Assume a Bayesian network has n
nodes X1, . . . , Xn in total. The joint distribution can be simplified as
P (X1, . . . , Xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|X1, . . . , Xi−1) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|Parents(Xi)), (6.2)
where Parents(Xi) is the set of direct parents of Xi. In the above example, we are able to
rewrite the joint distribution as
P (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) = P (X1)P (X2|X1)P (X3|X1)P (X4|X2, X3)P (X5|X4). (6.3)
This property significantly reduces the amount of required computation in large Bayesian
networks since each node usually has fewer parents compared with the overall size of the
network.
6.3.2 Bayesian Inference
There are two kinds of inference over a Bayesian network. The first is to evaluate the
joint probability of a specific assignment of values for all or a subset of variables in the
network. For all variables, we simply factorize the joint probability using Equation 6.2 and
calculate the product using provided conditional probabilities. For a subset of variables, we
marginalize over the variables not in the subset by summing up probabilities over them and
get the marginal probability of the subset of variables we are interested in.
The second and more interesting inference is to evaluate P (x|e), that is, the probability of
some particular assignment of a subset of variables (x) given assignments of other variables
(evidence e). In the scenario we mentioned in Section 6.3.1, one example of this kind of
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inference could be to evaluate P (X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T |X1 = spring). In this case,
{X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T} is our x and {X1 = spring} is our e. According to the definition
of conditional probability, we have P (x|e) = P (x, e)/P (e) = αP (x, e), where α = 1/P (e)
is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
x
P (x|e) = 1. Let Z represent the set of variables in
the network that is not in x and e, and z represents any particular value assignment of Z.
To get P (x, e), the marginal probability of {x, e} over Z needs to be calculated. Therefore,
we have
P (x|e) = α
∑
∀z∈Z
P (x, e, z). (6.4)
In the example, we can calculate P (X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T |X1 = spring) as
P (X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T |X1 = spring)
= α
∑
X3
P (X1 = spring)P (X2 = T |X1 = spring)P (X3|X1 = spring)
P (X4 = T |X2 = T,X3)P (X5 = T |X4 = T )
= αP (X1 = spring)P (X2 = T |X1 = spring)P (X3 = T |X1 = spring)
P (X4 = T |X2 = T,X3 = T )P (X5 = T |X4 = T )+
αP (X1 = spring)P (X2 = T |X1 = spring)P (X3 = F |X1 = spring)
P (X4 = T |X2 = T,X3 = F )P (X5 = T |X4 = T ) (6.5)
6.3.3 Belief Propagation
Belief propagation via message passing [102] is an algorithm to conduct inference on
Bayesian networks. To make it clearer, we first illustrate the belief propagation rules in a
general tree-structured Bayesian network where a node might have several children and one
parent. In the next subsection, we will introduce the two canonical models which generalize
our causal trees to polytrees.
We illustrate the belief propagation by specifying the activities of a typical node X having
m children, Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym, and a parent U as shown in Figure 6.4. The belief in the various
values of X depends on two distinct sets of evidence: evidence from the sub-tree rooted at
X , and the evidence from the rest of the tree. In general, let us define e−X as the evidence
contained in the tree rooted at X and define e+X as the evidence contained in the rest of
the network. e−Yj therefore represents the evidence from the sub-tree rooted at Yj where
j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. x ∈ {0, 1} is a particular value of X and u ∈ {0, 1} is a particular value
of U . The belief distribution of variable X can be calculated based on the following three
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Figure 6.4: Fragment of a causal tree, showing different kinds of evidence and support of a
node X
kinds of parameters:
1. Causal Support: πX(u) = P (u|e
+
X), contributed by parent of X .
2. Diagnostic Support: λYj(x) = P (e
−
Yj
|x), contributed by the Yj which is the j-th child
of X where j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
3. Conditional Probability Table (CPT): P (x|u) that relates the variable X to its direct
parent U . Each entry P (x|u) in the table defines the probability of value x of node X
given certain value u of node U .
We utilize the tree-structured Bayesian network for our anomaly reasoning. Each node
represents an attack step in the entire attack plan and it has two states of exist (1) and not
exist (0). A direct edge from node U to node X means that attack step U is a direct prior
step of attack step X and needs to be launched before X . In this way, we are able to reason
about the probability of existence of the attack by calculating the belief of each attack step.
The belief propagation algorithm runs whenever new evidence is found in the tree. The
propagation starts from the node which receives the new evidence and the new belief prop-
agates along the edges of the tree until all nodes get updated. The local belief updating at
each node X can be executed by three steps in any order.
Belief Propagation Algorithm
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Step 1 — Belief updating: Node X updates its belief measure based on the πX(u) mes-
sage from its parent and the messages λY1(x), λY2(x), . . . , λYm(x) from each of its children
as shown in Figure 6.4.
BEL(x) = αλ(x)π(x), (6.6)
where
λ(x) =
∏
j
λYj (x), (6.7)
π(x) =
∑
u
P (x|u)πX(u), (6.8)
and α is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
xBEL(x) = 1.
Step 2 — Bottom-up propagation: As shown in Figure 6.6, node X computes a new
message λX(u) based on its CPT and λ messages received from its children. Then X sends
λX(u) to its parent U .
λX(u) =
∑
x
λ(x)P (x|u), (6.9)
Figure 6.5: Bottom-up propagation
Step 3 — Top-down propagation: As shown in Figure 6.5, node X computes new π
messages and sends them to its children. The new πYj (x) message for its j-th child Yj is
calculated as
πYj (x) = απ(x)
∏
k 6=j
λYk(x). (6.10)
Boundary conditions are established as follows:
1. Root nodes: If X is a node with no parents, we set π(x) equal to the prior probability
P (x).
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Figure 6.6: Top-down propagation
2. Anticipatory nodes: If X is a childless node that has not been instantiated, we set
λ(x) = 1 for x ∈ {0, 1}
3. Evidence nodes: In our anomaly reasoning, evidence for a node X is obtained when
meta-alerts are matched to the node. We will discuss the matching mechanism in
Section 6.4.4. When evidence is obtained for X , we add a dummy auxiliary child node
X˜ to X as shown in Figure 6.7 and simulate the evidence by letting X˜ provide a
diagnostic support message λX˜(x) to X . We will describe our way to calculate λX˜(x)
in Section 6.4.2. This auxiliary node X˜ is not updated during the belief propagation
using the 3 steps mentioned. It only changes the way X calculates its own λ(x).
Therefore, if evidence of X is obtained, Equation 6.7 needs to be rewritten as
λ(x) = λX˜(x)
∏
j
λYj (x). (6.11)
6.3.4 The “noisy-OR” and“noisy-AND” Models
In Section 6.3.3, we illustrate the belief propagation algorithm in a general tree-structured
Bayesian network where a node has at most one parent. However, this structure lacks the
ability to represent nodes that might have multiple causes (i.e., node may have multiple
parents). In this subsection, we introduce two canonical models which allow us to generalize
our causal trees to causal polytrees. A polytree is a directed acyclic graph whose underlying
undirected graph is a tree. An example polytree is shown in Figure 6.8. The difference
between a polytree and a normal tree is that a node could have multiple parents in a polytree.
The two canonical models contain structures similar to logical OR-gate and AND-gate with
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Figure 6.7: Auxiliary child X˜ of X representing evidence received by X
noises and are thus called “noisy-OR” and “noisy-AND” models. The characteristics of these
two typical structures enable us to conduct the belief updating more efficiently in polytrees.
Figure 6.8: Polytree example
The “noisy-OR” Model
The “noisy-OR” model [102] is based on the noisy OR-gate structure shown in Figure 6.9.
Each node represents an event (attack step in our anomaly reasoning) with binary state 0
or 1. For a node X with n parents U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}, its value can be seen as the output
of a logical OR-gate. Each input to the OR-gate is the output of an AND-gate representing
the conjunction of Ui and the negation of its specific inhibitory mechanism Ii. The inhibitors
I1, . . . , In represent exceptions or abnormalities that interfere with the normal relationship
between U and X . We use qi to represent the probability that the i-th inhibitor is active.
Assume all inputs are 0 except Ui = 1. X will only be 1 if and only if the inhibitor Ii
associated with Ui remains inactive. That is,
P (X = 1|Ui = 1, Uk = 0 k 6= i) = 1− qi. (6.12)
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Figure 6.9: The noisy OR-gate
Therefore, ci = 1− qi represents the degree to which the single cause Ui = 1 can endorse the
consequent event X = 1. Let
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ui ∈ {0, 1} (6.13)
represent any assignment of values to parent set U . Note that both u and U are vectors
since X could have multiple parents. Let Tu = {i : Ui = 1} represent the subset of parents
that are 1. In the “noisy-OR” model, a link matrix P (x|u) is used to relate X to its parent
set U and can be written as
P (x|u) =

∏
i∈Tu
qi if x = 0
1−
∏
i∈Tu
qi if x = 1.
(6.14)
Having the link matrix P (x|u), we can follow similar belief propagation algorithm de-
scribed in Section 6.3.3. Assume X has m children, Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym. As it is shown in Figure
6.10, the local belief updating at X can be also executed by three steps in any order.
Belief Propagation Algorithm in “Noisy-OR” Model
Step 1 — Belief updating: Node X updates its belief measure based on the π1X , . . . ,
πnX from its parents and the λY1(x), . . . , λYm(x) from its children:
BEL(x) =
αλ0
∏
i(1− ciπiX) if x = 0
αλ1
[
1−
∏
i(1− ciπiX)
]
if x = 1,
(6.15)
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Figure 6.10: Belief propagation in causal polytree
where
λ(x) =
∏
j
λYj (x) =
λ0 if x = 0λ1 if x = 1 , (6.16)
πiX = P (ui = 1), (6.17)
and α is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
xBEL(x) = 1.
Step 2 — Bottom-up propagation: Node X computes new λX(ui) messages and sends
them to its parents U . The new λX(ui) message for its i-th parent Ui is calculates as
λX(ui) =
β
[
λ0qiΠ
′
i + λ1(1− qiΠ
′
i)
]
if ui = 1
β
[
λ0Π
′
i + λ1(1− Π
′
i)
]
if ui = 0,
(6.18)
where
Π′i =
∏
k 6=i
(1− ckπkX), (6.19)
and β is a normalizing constant.
Step 3 — Top-down propagation: Node X computes new πYj (x) messages and sends
them to its children. The new πYj (x) message for its j-th child Yj is calculated as
πYj (x) = α
BEL(x)
λYj (x)
. (6.20)
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Figure 6.11: The noisy AND-gate
The “noisy-AND” Model
The “noisy-AND” model [102] is based on the noisy AND-gate structure shown in Figure
6.11. The value of a node X with n parents U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} can be seen as the output
of a logical AND-gate. Each input to the AND-gate is the output of an OR-gate representing
the conjunction of Ui and the its specific enabling mechanism Ei. We use qi to represent the
probability that the i-th enabler is active. Assume all inputs are 1 except Ui = 0. X will be
0 if and only if the enabler Ei associated with Ui remains inactive. That is,
P (X = 1|Ui = 0, Uk = 1 k 6= i) = qi. (6.21)
Let ci = 1− qi and use Fu = {i : Ui = 0} to represent the subset of parents that are 0. The
link matrix P (x|u) can be written as
P (x|u) =
1−
∏
i∈Fu
qi if x = 0∏
i∈Fu
qi if x = 1.
(6.22)
Assume X has m children, Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym. The three steps of local belief updating at X
are listed as follows.
Belief Propagation Algorithm in “Noisy-AND” Model
Step 1 — Belief updating: Node X updates its belief measure based on the π1X , . . . ,
πnX from its parents and the λY1(x), . . . , λYm(x) from its children:
BEL(x) =
αλ0
{
1−
∏
i
[
1− ci(1− πiX)
]}
if x = 0
αλ1
∏
i
[
1− ci(1− πiX)
]
if x = 1,
(6.23)
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where
λ(x) =
∏
j
λYj (x) =
λ0 if x = 0λ1 if x = 1 , (6.24)
πiX = P (ui = 1), (6.25)
and α is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
xBEL(x) = 1.
Step 2 — Bottom-up propagation: Node X computes new λX(ui) messages and sends
them to its parents U . The new λX(ui) message for its i-th parent Ui is calculates as
λX(ui) =
β
[
λ0(1− Π
′
i) + λ1Π
′
i
]
if ui = 1
β
[
λ0(1− qiΠ
′
i) + λ1qiΠ
′
i
]
if ui = 0,
(6.26)
where
Π′i =
∏
k 6=i
[
1− ck(1− πkX)
]
, (6.27)
and β is a normalizing constant.
Step 3 — Top-down propagation: Node X computes new π messages and send them
to its children. The new πYj (x) message for its j-th child Yj is calculates as
πYj (x) = α
BEL(x)
λYj (x)
. (6.28)
6.4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
As we mentioned in Section 6.1, CAPTAR resides in the control center of the SCADA
network and its inputs are meta-alerts sent by EDMAND at the edge of the network. In this
section, we present a design overview of CAPTAR. The main architecture of CAPTAR is
shown in Figure 6.12. CAPTAR consists of 4 components: (1)Meta-alert Database, (2)Attack
Template Database, (3)Alert Correlator, (4)Causal Reasoning Engine.
The meta-alert database is used to store the meta-alerts from EDMAND. These meta-
alerts serve as evidence to our causal reasoning of anomalies. The attack template database
stores the potential attack templates which are causal polytrees created by domain experts.
These attack templates are Bayesian networks mentioned in Section 6.3.1 and contain the
“noisy-OR” and “noisy-AND” models mentioned in Section 6.3.4. They represent the prior
domain knowledge we have on potential attack plans and are used as the underlying Bayesian
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Figure 6.12: CAPTAR architecture
networks for the belief propagation mentioned in Section 6.3.3. One important step to reason
about the anomalies is to match meta-alerts to nodes (attack steps) in our attack templates.
And to do that, we need to evaluate whether one meta-alert is correlated with other meta-
alerts. The alert correlator takes two meta-alerts as inputs and outputs a correlation score
which is used to decide whether the two input meta-alerts are correlated or not. The core
component of CAPTAR is the causal reasoning engine which interacts with all other three
components. When the causal reasoning engine is started, it fetches copies of the attack
templates in the database and conducts alert matching as well as belief propagation on
them. The meta-alerts are retrieved from the meta-alert database and the alert matching is
done using the alert correlator. Whenever the belief of an attack is high enough, the engine
outputs the causal polytree corresponding to that attack with matched alerts. The operator
can further analyze the believes and matched alerts in the causal polytree to understand
each step of the attack.
In the following subsections, we will introduce the meta-alert, the attack template, the
alert correlator, and the causal reasoning engine in more detail.
6.4.1 Meta-alert
Meta-alerts are generated by EDMAND in Chapter 5 and sent to the control center where
CAPTAR resides. Each meta-alert is the aggregation of similar alerts and the aggregation
rules are mentioned in Table 5.4. Each meta-alert has several fields which are listed in Table
6.3. The fields that will be used in CAPTAR are alert id, alert type, index field, timestamp,
confidence score. Alert id is a string that is unique for each meta-alert. The received
78
meta-alerts from EDMAND will be first stored in the meta-alert database (implemented by
MongoDB). The alert id serves as the key to locate and retrieve the meta-alert from the
database. Alert type is a name that briefly describes the meta-alert. The current prototype
of EDMAND generates 24 types of alerts from the transport, operation, and content levels. A
complete list of the alert types is shown in Table 6.4. For simplicity reason, we assign an alert
type index to each alert type and we will use the index to represent the corresponding alert
type. Index field of the meta-alert contains additional information that helps to describe the
meta-alert, such as IP addresses, protocol, service, etc. This field is later used by the alert
correlator to correlate meta-alerts. Timestamp field simply contains a pair of timestamps
(start time, end time). They are the timestamps of the earliest and the latest alerts that have
been aggregated to the meta-alert. Confidence score field in the meta-alert represents the
confidence that the meta-alert is an anomaly indeed. It is the maximum of the confidence
scores of all the aggregated alerts for this meta-alert. As we mentioned in Section 5.3.2,
the confidence score (CS) for alert is calculated by CS = MA × AS, where MA is the
model accuracy and AS is the anomaly score. As stated in Section 6.3.3, if meta-alerts are
matched to a node X in our causal polytree, an auxiliary child node X˜ is added to X . The
confidence scores of the matched meta-alerts are used to calculate the diagnostic support
message λX˜(x) that X˜ provides to X . The way to calculate λX˜(x) will be introduced in
Section 6.4.2.
Alert Field Description
alert id a unique id for retrieving a meta-alert from the database
alert type a name that describes the meta-alert (see Table 6.4)
index field
a set of auxiliary information that helps to describe
the meta-alert (refer to Table 5.1)
timestamp a start time and an end time for the meta-alert
confidence score the confidence that the meta-alert represent an anomaly
statistical fields
more detailed information about the last alert aggregated
anomaly data
count number of alerts aggregated by the meta-alert
Table 6.3: Meta-alert fields and description
6.4.2 Attack Template
As we mentioned in Section 6.3, we utilize causal polytrees to reason about anomalies
in SCADA networks. We call these special causal polytrees attack templates and use AT s
to represent them. Attack templates represent and store the prior domain knowledge we
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Index Alert Type Alert Level
0 PACKET_IAT
Transport: Packet
1 PACKET_BYTES
2 NEW_ORIG
3 NEW_RESP
4 NEW_PROTOCOL
5 NEW_SERVICE
6 PACKET_AB_TOO_MANY
Transport: Flow
7 PACKET_AB_TOO_FEW
8 PACKET_BA_TOO_MANY
9 PACKET_BA_TOO_FEW
10 MEAN_BYTES_AB_TOO_LARGE
11 MEAN_BYTES_AB_TOO_SMALL
12 MEAN_BYTES_BA_TOO_LARGE
13 MEAN_BYTES_BA_TOO_SMALL
14 OPERATION_TOO_LATE
Operation
15 OPERATION_TOO_EARLY
16 OPERATION_MISSING
17 INVALID_FUNCTION_CODE
18 RESPONSE_FROM_ORIG
19 REQUEST_FROM_RESP
20 NEW_OPERATION
21 BINARY_FAULT
Content22 ANALOG_TOO_LARGE
23 ANALOG_TOO_SMALL
Table 6.4: Alert type
have for attacks. When an attack is launched, the triggered meta-alerts from EDMAND
are matched to the corresponding attack template and the belief propagation mentioned in
Section 6.3.3 is conducted on it. An example attack template for the data integrity attack
is shown in Figure 6.13. Each node X in an attack template AT is an attack step with zero,
one, or multiple parents and children. Each parent represents a prior cause attack step that
can lead to the current one and each child represents a posterior consequence attack step
that the current one can lead to. If there are multiple parents, they follow either the “noisy-
OR” or the “noisy-AND” model in Section 6.3.4. The prior probability at each node, the
probabilities qis of the inhibitory or enabling mechanisms in “noisy-OR” and “noisy-AND”
models are all specified by domain experts (e.g. power grid/SCADA security administrator)
when the attack template is created. Also, each attack template AT contains one or more
sink nodes (shaded node in Figure 6.13). Denote the set of sink nodes as SAT . Nodes in
SAT represent the final targets of the entire attack and we call them consequence nodes.
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Each consequence node has domain knowledge associated with such as attack consequence,
severity, and potential countermeasure.
Figure 6.13: An example of an attack template (causal polytree) using the “noisy-OR” model
Each attack step (each node) has two binary states: not exist (0) and exist (1). However,
the attack steps cannot be observed directly. We can only infer the existence of each attack
step by the alerts it triggers in EDMAND. Each attack step could trigger meta-alerts that
belong to multiple1 alert types mentioned in Section 6.4.1. Multiple meta-alerts can match
to one alert type of an attack step. As we mentioned in Section 6.3.3, these alerts are
treated as evidence to each attack step node. We create a structure, called alert unit table,
to store the matched meta-alerts at each attack step. An example of the alert unit table
is shown in Table 6.5. Each row in the table is an alert unit (AU ), which represents one
proportion of evidence. Let us assume there are k alert units in the table. Each alert unit
AU i consists of a weight wi and a list of alert types Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini, where ni is the number
of alert types in AU i. Therefore, AU i = {wi, Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini}. As we mentioned in Section
6.4.1, our current prototype of EDMAND can generate 24 types of alerts. Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini
are represented by the alert type indexes in Table 6.4 for simplicity reason. wi represents
how much the observation of one or more of the following alert types Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini can
prove the existence of the attack step and
∑
i wi = 1. Alert types in the same alert unit
express the same aspect of the attack step. Each alert type Aij in the alert unit table can
contain multiple meta-alerts from EDMAND of the same corresponding alert type. For
example, in the “data integrity attack” attack step in Figure 6.13, the alert unit table
contains one alert unit {1, 21, 22, 23}. Since there is just one alert unit, its weight is 1. The
three alert types are 21, 22, and 23, which represent BINARY_FAULT, ANALOG_TOO_LARGE, and
ANALOG_TOO_SMALL. These three types of content-level meta-alerts all represent the actual
tampering of the measurement data and are therefore included in the same alert unit.
1It is also possible that one attack step triggers no alerts in EDMAND. In this case, we can only infer
the existence of this attack step by the existence of its parents and children.
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Alert Unit Weight Alert Types
AU 1 w1 A11, A12, . . . , A1n1
AU 2 w2 A21, A22, . . . , A2n2
...
...
...
AU k wk Ak1, Ak2, . . . , Aknk
Table 6.5: Alert unit table for each attack step
As we mentioned in Section 6.3.3, if meta-alerts are matched to a node X and stored
in its alert unit table, an auxiliary child node X˜ is added to X . The confidence scores
of the matched meta-alerts are used to calculate the diagnostic support message λX˜(x)
that X˜ provides to X . To calculate λX˜(x), we utilize the confidence score of each meta-alert
mentioned in Section 6.4.1. For each alert type Aij in the alert unit table, we assume there are
mij meta-alerts aij1, aij2, . . . , aijmij matched to it (the matching mechanism will be described
in Section 6.4.4). The confidence scores of them are CS (aij1),CS(aij2), . . . ,CS (aijmij ). Let
CS (Aij) be the confidence score of the alert type Aij and it is calculated as
CS (Aij) =

∏mij
l=1 CS(aijl)∏mij
l=1 CS (aijl) +
∏mij
l=1(1− CS (aijl))
if mij > 0
Pmiss if mij = 0,
(6.29)
where Pmiss is a probability of missing meta-alerts and can be predefined by experience or
calculated if training data is available. After we have confidence score calculated for every
alert type in one alert unit AU i, we can write the confidence score of the alert unit CS (AU i)
as
CS (AU i) =
ni
max
j=1
CS (Aij). (6.30)
The final total confidence score of the attack step CS total is calculated by
CS total =
k∑
i=1
wiCS (AU i). (6.31)
The diagnostic support λX˜(x) provided by all the matched alerts to the attack step X is
written as
λX˜(x) =
1− CS total if x = 0CS total if x = 1 . (6.32)
Attack templates are created by domain experts and stored in the attack template database
before we start the anomaly reasoning. At the beginning of the reasoning, the causal reason-
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ing engine will fetch copies of the original attack templates and create an attack template set
ATS. Then the engine conducts alert matching as well as the belief propagation mentioned
in Section 6.3.3 on them. Each attack template AT in ATS originates from one attack
template in the database. And multiple attack templates in ATS could correspond to the
same attack (same attack template in the database). For each attack step X in an attack
template AT , BELX(1) represents the probability of existence of this attack step. The way
to calculate BELX(1) is introduced in Section 6.3. Since consequence nodes in SAT stand for
final targets of the entire attack represented by AT , the maximum probability of existence
of all consequence nodes in AT , denoted by BELmax(AT ), can represent the inferred success
possibility of the attack and is calculated as
BELmax(AT ) = max
X∈SAT
BELX(1). (6.33)
6.4.3 Alert Correlator
Figure 6.14: Alert correlation model
CAPTAR’s anomaly reasoning consists of meta-alert matching and belief propagation.
Meta-alert matching is the process of matching meta-alerts to attack steps (in attack tem-
plates) that trigger them. And the most important step of alert matching is to decide
whether two meta-alerts are correlated or not. Therefore, the alert correlator is designed for
this purpose. The alert correlator is a naive Bayes classifier whose graphical representation
is a Bayesian network in Figure 6.14 with one root node X and three leaf nodes Y1, Y2, and
Y3. The root node X represents the hypothesis that “the two input meta-alerts are corre-
lated” and has two states: “yes” (1) and “no” (0). Each leaf node Yj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) stands
for one type of observable evidence that helps to evaluate the hypothesis and has several
discrete states. Depending on whether two meta-alerts are correlated or not, the distribution
of states at the evidence nodes will be different. Therefore, based on the observed states at
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the evidence nodes, one can infer the probability that two meta-alerts are correlated. We
consider three kinds of observable evidence while correlating two meta-alerts: time difference
(Y1), IP similarity (Y2), and whether they share the same service (Y3).
• Time difference: The state of Y1 depends on the closeness in the time axis of the two
meta-alerts and we use Tdiff to represent that. As we described in Section 6.4.1, each
meta-alert from EDMAND has a start time and an end time. If the two meta-alerts
overlap, we assign 0 to Tdiff . Otherwise, we calculate Tdiff as the difference between
the end time of the earlier meta-alert and the start time of the latter one. Y1 has four
corresponding states according to Tdiff :
Y1 =

0 if Tdiff ≤ 60seconds
1 if 60seconds < Tdiff ≤ 1hour
2 if 1hour < Tdiff ≤ 1day
3 if Tdiff > 1day
. (6.34)
• IP similarity: The state of Y2 depends on the similarity of IP addresses related to the
two meta-alerts. Each meta-alert could have one or two related IP addresses. Content-
level alerts have one measure source IP while transport and operation level alerts have
two IPs for originator and responder. For every pair of IP addresses (IPa, IP b), where
IPa relates to one input meta-alert and IP b relates to the other, we calculate the
similarity of them as follows:
SIM (IPa, IP b) =

3 if IPa and IP b are exactly the same
2 if
IPa and IP b are not the same but
within the same 8-bit block
1 if
IPa and IP b are not within the same 8-bit
block but within the same 16-bit block
0 if
IPa and IP b are not within the same
16-bit block
(6.35)
The maximum similarity of all such IP pairs is selected as the state of Y2. Therefore,
Y2 has four states of {0, 1, 2, 3} and Y2 = max(IPa,IPb) SIM (IPa, IP b).
• Same service: Y3 evaluates whether the two meta-alerts share the same service (i.e.,
the same industrial control protocol). There are two states of Y3: “yes” (1) and “no”
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(0). A “no” is also specified if any of the input meta-alerts does not have a related
service.
Let x (x ∈ {0, 1}) represent the state of the root node in Figure 6.14. Let yj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3})
represent the state at each leaf node Yj and ŷj represent the already observed state. There
is a conditional probability table (CPT) at each leaf node Yj which relates Yj to X . As we
stated in Section 6.3.3, each entry P (yj|x) in the table defines the probability of state yj of
node Yj given certain state x of node X . Since X is a root node with no parent, we set pi(x)
to be the prior probability P (x) according to the boundary condition mentioned in Section
6.3.3. P (x) varies depending on the alert types of the two input meta-alerts. There is a
predefined prior probability for each pair of alert types based on domain knowledge. And
since the state of Yj is already observed as ŷj, we have
λ(yj) =
1 if yj = ŷj0 otherwise. (6.36)
According to the bottom-up propagation step in the belief propagation, the diagnostic sup-
port provided by Yk to X is λYj (x) =
∑
yj
λ(yj)P (yj|x) = P (ŷj|x). Therefore, the belief at
root X can be calculated as
BEL(x) = αλ(x)π(x) = απ(x)
3∏
j=1
λYj(x) = αP (x)
3∏
j=1
P (ŷj|x), (6.37)
where α is a normalizing factor rendering
∑
xBEL(x) = 1. We say two meta-alerts are
correlated if BEL(1) > 0.5 for X . Let a and b be the two input meta-alerts for the alert
correlator. We define the Correlate procedure of the alert correlator as follows:
Correlate(a, b) =
BEL(1) if BEL(1) > 0.5−1 otherwise, (6.38)
6.4.4 Causal Reasoning Engine
The causal reasoning engine is the core component of CAPTAR and it interacts with
all other three components. When the causal reasoning engine starts, it fetches copies of
attack templates AT s from the attack template database and creates an attack template set
ATS. Then it runs an anomaly reasoning algorithm to perform alert matching and belief
propagation on the attack templates in the attack template set. The meta-alerts used in
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the alert matching are retrieved from the meta-alert database and the alert correlator is
also used to correlate meta-alerts during the matching process. The belief propagation is
introduced in Section 6.3.
The anomaly reasoning algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.1. The AnalyzeAlert pro-
cedure in this algorithm is called whenever CAPTAR receives a new meta-alert or an update
to an existing alert. The procedure takes the meta-alert a and the current attack template
set ATS in the causal reasoning engine as inputs. The output is a new attack template
set ATSnew with the meta-alert a matched to some of the attack templates inside and be-
lief propagation performed. The procedure has two cases. If a is an update to an existing
meta-alert, then some attack templates in ATS might already have a matched. For each
AT of those attack templates, the algorithm gets the node X in AT that a is matched to.
Since the meta-alert is updated, the procedure recalculates the total confidence score CStotal
(presented in Section 6.4.2) of X . The diagnostic support λx˜(x) from all the matched alerts
is also recalculated. Since the evidence contained at X changes, a belief propagation in AT
from node X is initiated. In this case, the ATS with the updated attack templates are
directly assigned to ATSnew for output. If a is a newly detected meta-alert, the algorithm
iterates over the entire set ATS. For each attack template AT in ATS, it matches the
meta-alert a to nodes in AT and performs a belief propagation if there is a successful match.
This process is included in the procedure called MatchAlert. This procedure takes a and
AT as inputs and outputs a set of attack templates ATSmatch. The attack templates in
ATSmatch are copies of AT with a matched and belief propagation performed. Since it is
possible that a can match to multiple nodes in AT , ATSmatch could contain multiple copies.
If a cannot be matched to AT , ATSmatch will just contain the original AT . After we get
ATSmatch from MatchAlert(a, AT ), the attack templates in ATSmatch are all added to
ATSnew. After each run of the algorithm, namely each call of procedureAnalyzeAlert,
the attack template set ATS in the causal reasoning engine is replaced by ATSnew. The
engine then checks BELmax(AT ) (defined in Section 6.4.2) of every attack template AT in
the new attack template set. If it finds BELmax(AT ) > θBEL for any AT , it will output that
attack template AT for operator’s further analysis. Here θBEL is a predefined threshold and
we use θBEL = 0.8 for our CAPTAR prototype.
Before we introduce more details of the MatchAlert procedure, there are one concept
and another procedure we need to describe first. The concept is called happens before and
the procedure’s name is FindCorrelation. Happens before is a relationship between
two meta-alerts. We say meta-alert a happens before meta-alert b if the start time of a
is at least Thb earlier than the start time of b, where Thb = 10s is a predefined threshold.
The procedure FindCorrelation is shown in Algorithm 6.2. It takes a meta-alert a
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Algorithm 6.1 Anomaly Reasoning Algorithm
Input:
a - meta-alert to be analyzed
ATS - attack template set
Output:
ATSnew - new attack template set
procedure AnalyzeAlert(a,ATS)
ATSnew ← ∅
if a is an update of an existing meta-alert then
for each AT in ATS that has a as a matched alert do
recalculate CStotal and λx˜(x) of the matched node X
start a new belief propagation in AT from node X
end for
ATSnew ← ATS
else
for each AT in ATS do
ATSmatch ←MatchAlert(a, AT )
add ATSmatch to ATSnew
end for
end if
return ATSnew
end procedure
and a node X in the attack template as inputs and outputs a correlation score Cormax.
The objective of this procedure is to find whether the given node, its parents and children
have any matched alert that correlates with the given alert. The procedure does so by
iterating through every matched alert b of X , parents of X and children of X . For each b,
it calls the alert correlator and uses the Correlate procedure to correlate a and b. The
maximum result from Correlate(a, b) is stored in Cormax. If any correlation is found,
Cormax contains the highest correlation score. Otherwise, Cormax = 0. There are two
exceptions while correlating alerts from parents and children. For any matched alert b of
X ’s parents, there is a conflict if a happens before b. a is to be matched to X and X ’s parents
are attack steps that should lead to X . If there is an attack, the attack steps represented
by X ’s parents should be launched before X . That means a could not happens before b.
Therefore, a should not be matched to X and the procedure outputs −1 in this case. For
any matched alert b of X ’s children, the procedure outputs −1 if b happens before a for
similar reasons.
After describing the happens before concept and the FindCorrelation procedure, we
can start looking at the MatchAlert procedure which is shown in Algorithm 6.3. It takes
a meta-alert a and an attack template AT as inputs and outputs a set ATSmatch containing
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Algorithm 6.2 Find Correlation Procedure
Input:
a - meta-alert to find correlation with
X - a node in the attack template whose alert unit table contains the alert type of a
Output:
Cormax - maximum correlation
procedure FindCorrelation(a,X)
Cormax ← 0
for each matched alert b of X do
Cormax ← max(Cormax,Correlate(a, b))
end for
for each parent U of X do
for each matched alert b of U do
if a happens before b then
return −1
end if
Cormax ← max(Cormax,Correlate(a, b))
end for
end for
for each child Y of X do
for each matched alert b of Y do
if b happens before a then
return −1
end if
Cormax ← max(Cormax,Correlate(a, b))
end for
end for
return Cormax
end procedure
attack templates generated after matching. The objective of this procedure is to try to match
meta-alert a to the attack template AT . It iterates over every node X in AT whose alert
unit table contains alert type of a. It calls the procedure FindCorrelation to correlate a
with X . If the result is greater than 0, it means a finds correlation in X . If the result is 0,
it means a finds no correlation in X but it can be matched to X . We add X to a potential
node set Xpot. If the result is less than 0, it means a could not be matched to X due to
conflicts. If a finds correlation in any node in AT , this means we have good reason to believe
a is triggered by the attack represented by the current attack template AT . Therefore, we
match a to the node Xcor with the highest correlation score and start a belief propagation
from Xcor. In this case, the output will be a set containing only the updated AT with a
matched. If a finds no correlation in AT but Xpot is not empty, this means there is no proof
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that a is triggered by AT but there are attack steps in AT that could potentially trigger
a and the attack steps are included in Xpot. Therefore, the procedure iterates over Xpot
explores every possibility. For every node X in Xpot, it creates a new copy ATmatch of AT .
Note that this copy contains not only the nodes of AT but also all already matched alerts
of AT . It then matches a to X ’s counterpart in ATmatch and starts a belief propagation
in ATmatch from that node. By doing this, the procedure takes every potential match of
a in AT into consideration and the final output will contain the original AT as well as all
updated copies of it. Finally, if there is no node in AT that a could match to, the output
will just contain the original AT .
Algorithm 6.3 Match Alert Procedure
Input:
a - meta-alert to be matched
AT - attack template
Output:
ATSmatch - attack template set after matching
procedure MatchAlert(a, AT )
ATSmatch ← {AT}, Xcor ← None, Xpot ← ∅, Cormax ← 0
for each node X in AT whose alert unit table contains alert type of a do
Cor ← FindCorrelation(a,X)
if Cor > 0 then
if Cor > Cormax then
Cormax ← Cor , Xcor ← X
end if
else if Cor = 0 then
add X to Xpot
end if
end for
if Xcor is not None then
match a to Xcor and start the belief propagation of AT from Xcor
else
for each node X in Xpot do
ATmatch ← copy of AT
match a to X in ATmatch and start a belief propagation of ATmatch from X
add ATmatch to ATSmatch
end for
end if
return ATSmatch
end procedure
In the description of the MatchAlert procedure, we mentioned that the procedure will
explore every potential match of a and create multiple copies of the original attack template
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AT if no exact match can be found. This will increase the number of attack templates in the
attack template set ATS. To prevent the number of attack templates from exploding, we
set a maximum limit K for the number of attack templates to keep for each kind of attack.
Attack templates with lower BELmax(AT ) will be dropped when the number exceeds the
limit. Also, attack templates will also be dropped from the set if they have not been updated
for a long time.
The attack templates, output by the causal reasoning engine, represent attacks of high
probability of existence in the SCADA network. The operators can not only understand
the origin of the attacks by examining the belief of each attack step and the corresponding
alerts, but also evaluate the attack consequences and take countermeasures by utilizing the
domain knowledge contained in the consequence nodes.
Example Run for the Anomaly Reasoning Algorithm
We use an example to better illustrate the anomaly reasoning algorithm. Consider the
attack template AT in Figure 6.15. Let us assume this is the only attack template in the
database. At the beginning of the anomaly reasoning, the causal reasoning engine fetches AT
from the database and creates the attack template set ATS = {AT} as shown in Figure
6.16. Now the attacker first launched a man-in-the-middle attack. CAPTAR receives an
OPERATION_TOO_LATE meta-alert a1 from EDMAND. This meta-alert a1 is first stored in
the meta-alert database and then fed into the causal reasoning engine. Upon receiving this
meta-alert a1, the engine calls the anomaly reasoning algorithm. It finds that a1 is a new
meta-alert, so the procedure MatchAlert is called to match a1 to the only attack template
AT in ATS. The MatchAlert procedure finds that node X1 is the only node whose
alert unit tables contains alert type OPERATION_TOO_LATE. Therefore, it calls the procedure
FindCorrelation with a1 and X1 as inputs. The procedure FindCorrelation tries to
find any meta-alert in X1 and X3 that correlates with meta-alert a1. However, since X1
and X3 have no matched alert yet, the procedure finds no correlation and returns 0 in this
case. Since no correlation of a1 in the attack template AT is found and X1 is the only
node that a1 can match to, a copy ÂT of the attack template AT is created, and the meta-
alert a1 is matched to X̂1 in the copy ÂT . A belief propagation is performed on ÂT . The
MatchAlert procedure returns both AT and ÂT . Finally, both AT and ÂT are added to
ATSnew to replace ATS.
Now the attacker intercepts and tampers with some binary data. CAPTAR receives a
meta-alert a2 with alert type of BINARY_FAULT from EDMAND as shown in Figure 6.17.
a2 is first stored in the meta-alert database and then forwarded to the causal reasoning
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Figure 6.15: Example attack template AT
Figure 6.16: Algorithm run upon receiving meta-alert a1
engine. The anomaly reasoning algorithm again finds that a2 is a new meta-alert, so the
procedure MatchAlert is called to match a2 to both AT and ÂT . Matching a2 to AT
is similar to matching a1 to AT and there is no correlation of a2 in the attack template
AT . Matching a2 to ÂT is a bit different. The procedure finds that node X̂3 is the only
node whose alert unit tables contains alert type BINARY_FAULT. Therefore, the procedure
FindCorrelation is called with a2 and X̂3 as inputs. Since X̂1 is the parent of X̂3 and a1
is a matched alert to X̂1. The procedure sends both a2 and a1 to the alert correlator and
finds that they are correlated. Therefore, it returns the correlation score of a1 and a2. Since
the FindCorrelation procedure finds one correlation of a2 in the attack template ÂT , a2
is matched to X̂3 and a belief propagation is performed on ÂT . After this run, the attack
template set ATS contains the original AT and updated ÂT .
Later, EDMAND sends another updated BINARY_FAULT meta-alert â2 to CAPTAR as
shown in Figure 6.18. The anomaly reasoning algorithm finds that â2 is an update to an
existing meta-alert a2. Also, it finds that ÂT in ATS contains a2. Therefore, it replaces
a2 with â2 in ÂT and starts new belief propagations in ÂT . After this run, the causal
reasoning engine finds that BELmax(ÂT ) exceeds the predefined threshold. Therefore, the
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Figure 6.17: Algorithm run upon receiving meta-alert a2
engine outputs ÂT to the operator. The operator can see from ÂT that there is a data
integrity attack going on and the attacker first launched a man in the middle attack (MITM)
to achieve that. The two matched alerts a1 and â2 can also be used for more detailed analysis
by the operator.
Figure 6.18: Algorithm run upon receiving meta-alert â2
6.5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the anomaly reasoning ability of CAPTAR via three simu-
lated attack scenarios. We implement a prototype of CAPTAR and reuse our prototype
of EDMAND described in Chapter 5. The baseline traffic is 14 days of simulated DNP3
traffic of one control center communicating with 10 remote terminal units (RTUs). More
details of the baseline traffic can be found in Section 5.6. We create three attack templates
representing three common attacks in SCADA networks: TCP SYN flood, data integrity
attack, and command injection.
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• TCP SYN flood : The attack template for TCP SYN flood is shown in Figure 6.19. The
attacker starts by an IP address scan to find out the active IP addresses in the subnet.
Then the TCP SYN flood is conducted by sending a succession of SYN requests to the
target with spoofed source addresses.
Figure 6.19: TCP SYN flood
• Data integrity attack : The attack template for data integrity attack is shown in Figure
6.20. The attacker first either launches a man-in-the-middle attack or compromises
some field devices. The measurement data sent back to the control center are then
tampered to mislead the control system.
Figure 6.20: Data integrity attack
• Command injection: The attack template for command injection is shown in Figure
6.21. The attacker first either launches a man-in-the-middle attack or conducts an IP
address scan followed by a service scan. Malicious control commands are then injected
into the packets to attack the substations.
In our evaluation, we launch the above three attacks in our simulated SCADA network.
CAPTAR together with EDMAND are able to identify and differentiate all three attacks.
Moreover, the output of CAPTAR gives the operator a better idea of the likelihood of each
attack step even if there is no direct alert representation of the step. For example, the attack
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Figure 6.21: Command injection
step of “compromised node” in the data integrity attack has no detectable alert by EDMAND
(for now). However, CAPTAR can still infer the high chance of existence of a compromised
node if it sees the existence of the “data integrity attack” consequence node and the absence
of the “man in the middle” node. Notice that the expressiveness of attack templates can be
improved by increasing the number of meta-alert types that can be triggered by EDMAND.
CAPTAR can also reason about alerts not from EDMAND as long as they are preprocessed
to follow the same format.
We now briefly calculate the time complexity of the anomaly reasoning algorithm. We start
by estimating the time complexity of the FindCorrelation procedure. Let us assume M
to be the number of meta-alerts in the database. In the worst case, the FindCorrelation
needs to correlate the input meta-alert with all other meta-alerts. Since the time complexity
of correlating a pair of meta-alerts is constant, the FindCorrelation procedure has a
O(M) time complexity. Let us assume the maximum number of nodes in any attack template
is N and L is the number of attack templates in the database. In the MatchAlert
procedure, the first ‘for’ loop needs to go over every node in the template in the worst case,
which has a time complexity of O(MN). The belief propagation is O(N), and Npot has N
nodes in the worst case. So the rest of the procedure has a time complexity of O(N2). The
total time complexity of MatchAlert is therefore O(MN+N2). In the anomaly reasoning
algorithm, the maximum attack template number is KL. It can be easily derived that the
time complexity of the algorithm is O(KLN(M + N)). Usually, we have M ≫ N , so the
anomaly reasoning algorithm has an estimated time complexity of O(KLMN) in the worst
case. K and N are usually less than 10. L should be several dozens. M is also limited
to dozens or hundreds due to the alert aggregation and removing of stale meta-alerts from
the database. Therefore, the total time complexity of the algorithm is reasonable. And
notice that the frequency CAPTAR runs the anomaly reasoning algorithm is decided by the
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frequency that EDMAND sends meta-alerts. As mentioned in 5.4.2, EDMAND sends meta-
alerts in a periodic manner only if there are updates to those meta-alerts in the latest period.
So the sending rate of meta-alerts by EDMAND is also limited. Therefore, CAPTAR is able
to satisfy the real-time anomaly reasoning need for those meta-alerts.
To give a better understanding of the time overhead of CAPTAR, we measure the time
to run the FindCorrelation procedure, the belief propagation, and the anomaly reason-
ing algorithm for the three attack scenarios on a Ubuntu 16.04 desktop with 12 Intel Xeon
3.60GHz CPUs and 16GB memory. For each attack scenario, we run CAPTAR on the en-
tire traffic set including the corresponding attack and calculate the average and standard
deviation in millisecond of the time overheads for FindCorrelation, belief propagation,
and the anomaly reasoning algorithm. We also record the sample number, which is the
number of time FindCorrelation, belief propagation, and the anomaly reasoning algo-
rithm have been performed. The results are shown in Table 6.6. We can see that the time
overheads are definitely small enough to satisfy the real-time reasoning requirement of the
meta-alerts. Note that the average time to run the FindCorrelation procedure and the
anomaly reasoning algorithm varies a lot across different attack scenarios. This is because
the time overheads of FindCorrelation and the anomaly reasoning algorithm depend on
the number of meta-alert M as we described previously. And those three attack scenarios
generate 104(TCP SYN flood), 7(data integrity attack), and 26(command injection) meta-
alerts respectively. This results in the different time overheads of FindCorrelation and
the anomaly reasoning algorithm for them. Another fact is that all the time overheads have
relatively high standard deviation. This is mainly due to the change to meta-alert number
in the meta-alert database during the attack. As the attack continues, the number of meta-
alerts in the database increases, and so do the time overheads for FindCorrelation, belief
propagation, and the anomaly reasoning algorithm.
Attack
FindCorrelation Belief Propagation Anomaly Reasoning
avg std num avg std num avg std num
TCP SYN flood 7.60 4.58 64 0.21 0.12 64 41.39 28.90 122
Data integrity attack 0.48 0.37 4 0.10 0.04 4 19.76 48.72 12
Command injection 2.65 1.61 25 0.14 0.02 25 13.95 34.52 40
Table 6.6: Average(avg in ms), standard deviation(std in ms), and sample number(num)
of time overhead for FindCorrelation, belief propagation, and the anomaly reasoning
algorithm
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6.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we propose a causal-polytree-based anomaly reasoning framework for
SCADA networks, named CAPTAR. CAPTAR takes the meta-alerts from EDMAND and
performs alert correlation and attack plan recognition. Experiments using a prototype of
CAPTAR and simulated traffic show that CAPTAR is able to detect and differentiate various
attack scenarios in a real-time manner. The generated reasoning results can provide the
operators with a high-level view of the security state of the protected SCADA network.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I first conclude this thesis by summarizing each work I have done. After
that, I will discuss how domain specific is this thesis and how it can be generalized to a
broader domain.
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, I use an integrated approach of edge-cloud design, real-time data operations,
and causal security analysis and propose four frameworks to help to guarantee the situational
awareness of Smart Grid. One of them protects situational awareness in WAMS by using on-
line data compression to reduce the huge and increasing volume of data in the communication
networks to avoid congestions. The other three of them use anomaly detection and causal
anomaly reasoning to enhance security of SCADA systems and thus guarantee situational
awareness. Note that although I focus only on WAMS and SCADA systems in Smart Grid
in this thesis, the proposed frameworks could potentially be utilized to help with situational
awareness of similar industrial control systems in other large-scale distributed critical in-
frastructure systems (e.g., oil/gas pipelines and refineries, water distribution and treatment)
after minor adaptations.
7.1.1 OLAF: Operation-Level Traffic Analyzer Framework for SCADA System
The current SCADA systems in Smart Grid are facing increasing security risks. To provide
end-to-end security against both external and internal attacks, both the end host devices
and the network need to be secured. In the current architecture, the control centers are
responsible for both the device status analysis and network traffic analysis. Since the control
center needs to wait for the data from measurement devices before doing any processing and
analysis, it is increasingly hard to provide up-to-date situational awareness as the number
of deployed measurement devices grows. To address this issue, in Chapter 3, I propose
OLAF, an edge-based, extensible, and efficient operation-level traffic analyzer. OLAF resides
in substations of SCADA systems and is able to provide preliminary but more prompt
situational awareness by performing network traffic analysis and device status analysis at
the edge. Experimental results are encouraging by showing strong anomaly detection ability
and low time overhead of OLAF.
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7.1.2 ISAAC: Intelligent Synchrophasor Data Real-Time Compression Framework for
WAMS
The huge and rapidly increasing data volume in WAMS imposes a heavy burden on the
communication and storage systems and could result in frequent and severe congestion if
not handled carefully. The situational awareness of the system could suffer a lot from the
extremely long delays or high packet loss rates that follow the congestion. In Chapter
4, I propose ISAAC, an intelligent synchrophasor data real-time compression framework
for WAMS to be deployed at the edge of WAMS. Based on a combination of PCA and
DCT techniques, ISAAC is able to mitigate the burden on communication systems laid by
the huge synchrophasor data volume while satisfying the requirements of real-time WAMS
applications. A disturbance detector is utilized to identify disturbance data and satisfy its
stricter delay and accuracy requirements. ISAAC can achieve good compression ratios while
maintaining satisfying delay and accuracy for the reconstructed data. The performance of
ISAAC is validated by experiments based on real synchrophasor data.
7.1.3 EDMAND: Edge-Based Multi-Level Anomaly Detection for SCADA Networks
The light-weighted operation-level traffic analyzer, named OLAF, in Chapter 3 provides
preliminary analysis of SCADA. That is not enough to guarantee situational awareness and
a more thorough monitoring and analysis is required. Based on different analysis granularity,
data in SCADA network traffic generally can be divided into three levels: transport level,
operation level, and content level. Monitoring and event detection of only one or two of the
three levels is not enough to detect and reason about attacks in all three levels. In Chapter
5, I develop EDMAND, an edge-based multi-level anomaly detection framework for SCADA
networks. EDMAND resides in remote substations of SCADA systems and monitors network
traffic at flow level, operation level, and content level. Distinct data characteristics are taken
into consideration when selecting anomaly detection method for each level. When anomalies
are detected, EDMAND generates, aggregates, and prioritizes alerts and sends them to
control centers. Moreover, the concept of confidence score is introduced into the anomaly
detection process and confidence scores are assigned to generated alerts. The performance
of EDMAND is validated by synthetic DNP3 traffic with various anomalies injected.
7.1.4 CAPTAR: Causal-Polytree-based Anomaly Reasoning for SCADA Networks
My work EDMAND, described in Chapter 5, resides at the edges of the SCADA network,
detects anomalies at multiple levels of the network, and sends aggregated and prioritized
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meta-alerts to the control center. However, only knowing what anomalies are happening in
the system without understanding why they happen is definitely not enough to guarantee
situational awareness. There is a need for an efficient system to correlate the alerts in an
intelligent manner and match temp to potential attack(s) based on domain knowledge to
discover attack strategies. In Chapter 6, I present a causal-polytree-based anomaly reasoning
framework for SCADA networks, named CAPTAR. CAPTAR takes the meta-alerts from
EDMAND and performs alert correlation and attack plan recognition. Experiments, using
a prototype of CAPTAR and simulated traffic, show that CAPTAR is able to detect and
differentiate across various attack scenarios in real time. The generated reasoning results can
provide the operators with a high-level view of the security state of the protected SCADA
network.
7.2 DISCUSSION
The four frameworks in this thesis (OLAF, ISAAC, EDMAND, CAPTAR) are designed
to provide situational awareness to Smart Grid and are domain specific. Quite an amount
of domain-specific knowledge is utilized during the development of the frameworks. For
example, one important prerequisite that allows EDMAND to use statistics such as mean
and standard deviation to perform anomaly detection is that the traffic in SCADA net-
works is mostly periodic. The same approach cannot work for the Internet which has much
more irregular and bursty traffic. Also, the characteristics of measurement data utilized
by EDMAND to do content-level anomaly detection is only valid for this specific domain.
CAPTAR is designed specifically for Smart Grid as well with the parameters in the alert
correlator set by domain experts and attack template database containing typical attacks
for this domain.
Although the four frameworks in this thesis are designed specifically for Smart Grid, the
contribution of this thesis is more than proposing approaches to provide situational awareness
to Smart Grid. Some methodologies used by this thesis can be applied to broader contexts.
For example, ISAAC identifies the different compression requirements for normal traffic and
traffic with disturbances, and applies different compression methods. The the compression
technique of reusing the transformation matrix in Principal component analysis can also be
generalized to other domains. EDMAND benefits from the idea of dividing data to multiple
levels by different analysis granularity and applying appropriate mechanism to each level.
Introducing the concept of confidence score to anomaly detection and assigning confidence
scores to alerts is another valuable design decision that can be used by other domains. The
way to differentiate data measurements into different classes using Bayesian inference is not
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limited to the specific scenarios. Actually, both the meta-alert priority score calculation in
EDMAND and the alert correlation in CAPTAR reuse the same concept. By using causal
reasoning, CAPTAR is able to combine weak indications (indirect evidence) of anomalies,
represented by meta-alerts, and derive stronger indications. The causal polytrees utilizing
“noisy-OR” and “noisy-AND” models, the auxiliary child to represent indirect evidence, and
the belief propagation on those polytress can all be adapted to different use cases. And the
anomaly reasoning algorithm is also not domain-specific. All these methodologies are not
limited to the specific domain of Smart Grid and can be applied to broader domains.
For example, the aforementioned methodologies can be generalized to the domain of In-
ternet of Things (IoT). Providing situational awareness in IoT is also of great importance.
Security and data volume are issues in IoT as well. To adapt frameworks in this thesis to
the domain of IoT, several changes need to be made on the frameworks and some major
ones are listed as follows.
• The parsers and data extractors in this thesis only support several communication
protocols in Smart Grid (e.g. Modbus, DNP3). They need to be modified to support
communication protocols in IoT.
• The attack templates in CAPTAR correspond to attacks commonly seen in SCADA
networks. However, the common attacks in SCADA might not be the same with the
common attacks in IoT. New attack templates for the IoT domain need to be created
by experts.
• In EDMAND, the different characteristics of data traffic in different levels are utilized
to select appropriate anomaly detection mechanisms. The characteristics of traffic in
IoT are different from those in SCADA. The new characteristics need to be reconsidered
to select appropriate anomaly detection mechanisms for IoT domain.
• The ontology of alerts in this thesis is domain-specific. The alerts have fields (even
protocol specific fields) typical to SCADA and the alert types are also defined by
domain knowledge. The ontology needs to be adapted to IoT domain and alert types
need to be redefined to reflect common anomalies in IoT.
• Various domain specific parameters in the frameworks need to be reset by experts from
IoT domain. For example, in the alert correlator of CAPTAR, the prior probabilities
of different alert types and the elements in the conditional probability table are all
domain-specific and have new values in the IoT domain.
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• The adapted frameworks also need to meet the time overhead requirements in IoT
which are different from those in Smart Grid. For example, the current time overheads
of EDMAND and CAPTAR are good enough for SCADA networks. If IoT applica-
tions have stricter time requirements, the anomaly detection and anomaly reasoning
algorithms might need to be simplified or performed in a more efficient manner to
guarantee lower time overheads.
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CHAPTER 8: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this chapter, I first share some of the lessons I learned while working on this thesis.
Then some preliminary thoughts of potential future research directions are given.
8.1 LESSONS LEARNED
My Ph.D. study was a tough but fruitful journey. I have learned a lot from all the research
I have done as well as working on this thesis and I want to share several lessons I have learned.
The first lesson is that getting access to real world traffic for cyber-physical systems
such as the Smart Grid is challenging. Since cyber-physical systems are usually critical
infrastructures, utilities are not willing to share their traffic traces due to security and
privacy concerns. Acquiring normal traffic is very hard and getting access to real traffic
with attacks is almost impossible. Therefore, sometimes researchers have no alternative but
to use and work with simulated data. Developing better simulators and techniques that help
utilities to share their data in secure manner could be topics worth exploring.
The second lesson is that learning and understanding domain knowledge, and collaborat-
ing with domain experts is beneficial and necessary for delivering impactful research results.
Developing approaches to provide situational awareness for Smart Grid requires a good un-
derstanding of cyber systems (e.g., SCADA, WAMS), devices (e.g., PMUs, MTUs, RTUs),
communication protocols (e.g., Modbus, DNP3), measurement characteristics, domain spe-
cific attacks, etc. Knowing the physical model and physical laws in Smart Grid can also
help with identifying the normal and abnormal behaviors in the system. Working closely
with domain experts ensures that research has practical value and can be deployed in real
systems.
The third lesson is that extending the breadth of knowledge is of great importance to do
interdisciplinary research. For example, in my thesis, there is an integration of knowledge
from various areas including system design, data analytic, security, compression techniques,
real-time systems, edge computing, Bayesian inference, causal analysis, etc. Applying well-
known techniques from other domains and adapting them to my own research area was a
good way to come up with novel research ideas.
Last but not the least, accessing and identifying the limits of my work was very helpful in
finding new research directions. For example, after I developed OLAF, I found that OLAF
was not able to detect any anomaly in measurement data. Also, sometimes the frequency
of alerts was too high, which meant difficulty for operators to learn useful information from
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the alerts. Those limits of OLAF actually inspired the development of both EDMAND and
CAPTAR. Another example is that although EDMAND’s time overhead is good enough for
SCADA networks, it is still too large for systems with much higher data sampling frequencies
such as WAMS. Therefore, developing anomaly detection mechanisms and data structures
with higher time efficiency might be an interesting future research direction.
8.2 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The complexity of Smart Grid keeps growing as new technologies are introduced to it.
Therefore, operating Smart Grid will become increasingly challenging and guaranteeing sit-
uational awareness will be even more important. In this thesis, I am only able to cover a
limited part of the problem and there are many other aspects that remain to be explored.
Some potential future research directions that are highly related to this thesis are as follows.
First, I mainly focus on the anomaly detection and anomaly reasoning on SCADA net-
work traffic in OLAF, EDMAND, and CAPTAR. The physical model of the system can also
provide potentially useful information for the detection and reasoning of anomalies. Taking
the physical model and constraints into consideration could help with the analysis of mea-
surement data and system state. Therefore, one direction of future research is to utilize a
hybrid approach of cyber and physical models to provide comprehensive security analysis of
Smart Grid.
Second, after the attack plan is recognized as discussed in CAPTAR, the operator of
SCADA networks still needs to decide how to react to it. It is beneficial if some potential
consequences and responses could be provided together with the inferred attack. Therefore,
how to give useful suggestions for countermeasures to attacks, given the inferred attack plan
and current state of the system, could be an interesting research problem.
Third, various mechanisms to help to create attack templates could be explored. Specifica-
tion language could be designed to help domain experts to transfer their domain knowledge
into attack templates. Also, the structural causal models and various tools mentioned in
[103] could be utilized to find the causal relationship of attack steps from existing attack
traces.
Fourth, due to the reasons I mentioned in Section 8.1, real traffic is hard to acquire. Some
frameworks in this thesis are evaluated by simulated traffic. If in the future access to real
traffic or even real attack traces could be obtained, it is worth evaluating those frameworks
again by real traffic data. If further collaboration with utilities can be achieved, deploying
those frameworks to real systems and evaluating the real-time performance of them could
be pretty interesting.
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Fifth, as I discussed in Section 7.2, frameworks in this thesis have the potential to be
generalized to broader areas. Therefore, adapting those frameworks and reapplying them
to other domains such as general IoT networks and data center networks could inspire new
research projects.
Last but not least, SCADA and WAMS are used together in many Smart Grids today.
The interdependency of these two complex systems could create entirely new security and
managing problems. For example, the high data rate in WAMS introduces stricter time
requirements for security protection mechanisms and more time-efficient approaches need to
be developed. Targeting those new problems by considering these two systems as a whole is
worth researchers’ attention.
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